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Abstract: Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have recently attracted 
a lot of interest in the research community due their wide range of 
applications. Due to distributed nature of these networks and their 
deployment in remote areas, these networks are vulnerable to 
numerous security threats that can adversely affect their proper 
functioning. This problem is more critical if the network is 
deployed for some mission-critical applications such as in a tactical 
battlefield. Random failure of nodes is also very likely in real-life 
deployment scenarios. Due to resource constraints in the sensor 
nodes, traditional security mechanisms with large overhead of 
computation and communication are infeasible in WSNs. Security 
in sensor networks is, therefore, a particularly challenging task. 
This paper discusses the current state of the art in security 
mechanisms for WSNs. Various types of attacks are discussed and 
their countermeasures presented. A brief discussion on the future 
direction of research in WSN security is also included.   
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1. Introduction 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of hundreds or 
even thousands of small devices each with sensing, 
processing, and communication capabilities to monitor the 
real-world environment. They are envisioned to play an 
important role in a wide variety of areas ranging from critical 
military surveillance applications to forest fire monitoring 
and building security monitoring in the near future [12]. In 
these networks, a large number of sensor nodes are deployed 
to monitor a vast field, where the operational conditions are 
most often harsh or even hostile. However, the nodes in 
WSNs have severe resource constraints due to their lack of 
processing power, limited memory and energy. Since these 
networks are usually deployed in remote places and left 
unattended, they should be equipped with security 
mechanisms to defend against attacks such as node capture, 
physical tampering, eavesdropping, denial of service, etc. 
Unfortunately, traditional security mechanisms with high 
overhead are not feasible for resource constrained sensor 
nodes. The researchers in WSN security have proposed 
various security schemes which are optimized for these 
networks with resource constraints. A number of secure and 
efficient routing protocols [28, 50, 49, 69], secure data 
aggregation protocols [21, 30, 52, 77, 64, 83] etc. has been 
proposed by several researchers in WSN security. 
In addition to traditional security issues like secure routing 
and secure data aggregation, security mechanisms deployed 
in WSNs also should involve collaborations among the nodes 
due to the decentralized nature of the networks and absence 
of any infrastructure. In real-world WSNs, the nodes can not 
be assumed to be trustworthy apriori. Researchers have 
therefore, focused on building a sensor trust model to solve 
the problems which are beyond the capabilities of traditional 
cryptographic mechanisms [8, 93, 92, 39, 60, 70, 82, 84]. 
Since in most cases, the sensor nodes are unattended and 
physically insecure, vulnerability to physical attack is an 
important issue in WSNs. A number of propositions exist in 
the literature for defense against physical attack on sensor 
nodes [10, 1, 32, 35, 41, 73, 74, 79, 61, 81].  
In this chapter, we present a survey of the security issues in 
WSNs. First we outline the constraints of WSNs, security 
requirements in these networks, and various possible attacks 
and the corresponding countermeasures. Then a holistic view 
of the security issues is presented. These issues are classified 
into six categories: cryptography, key management, secure 
routing, secure data aggregation, intrusion detection and trust 
management. The advantages and disadvantages of various 
security protocols are discussed, compared and evaluated. 
Some open research issues in each of these areas are also 
discussed.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, various constraints in WSNs are discussed. 
Section 3 presents the security requirements in WSNs. 
Section 4 discusses various attacks that can be launched on 
WSNs. Section 5 presents the numerous countermeasures for 
all possible attacks on WSNs. Finally, Section 6 concludes 
the paper highlighting some future directions of research in 
WSN security.   
2. Constraints in Wireless Sensor Networks 
A wireless sensor network consists of a large number of 
sensor nodes which are inherently resource-constrained. 
These nodes have limited processing capability, very low 
storage capacity, and constrained communication bandwidth. 
These limitations are due to limited energy and physical size 
of the sensor nodes. Due to these constraints, it is difficult to 
directly employ the conventional security mechanisms in 
WSNs. In order to optimize the conventional security 
algorithms for WSNs, it is necessary to be aware about the 
constraints of sensor nodes [27]. Some of the major 
constraints of a WSN are listed below. 
Energy constraints: Energy is the biggest constraint for a 
WSN. In general, energy consumption in sensor nodes can be 
categorized in three parts: (i) energy for the sensor 
transducer, (ii) energy for communication among sensor 
nodes, and (iii) energy for microprocessor computation. The 
study in [14] found that each bit transmitted in WSNs 
consumes about as much power as executing 800 to 1000 
instructions. Thus, communication is more costly than 
computation in WSNs. Any message expansion caused by 
security mechanisms comes at a significant cost. Further, 
higher security levels in WSNs usually correspond to more 
energy consumption for cryptographic functions. Thus, 
WSNs could be divided into different security levels 
depending on energy cost [4, 85].  
Memory limitations: A sensor is a tiny device with only a 
small amount of memory and storage space. Memory is a 
sensor node usually includes flash memory and RAM. Flash 
memory is used for storing downloaded application code and 
RAM is used for storing application programs, sensor data, 
and intermediate results of computations. There is usually not 
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enough space to run complicated algorithms after loading the 
OS and application code. In the SmartDust project, for 
example, TinyOS consumes about 4K bytes of instructions, 
leaving only 4500 bytes for security and applications [14]. A 
common sensor type- TelosB- has a 16-bit, 8 MHz RISC 
CPU with only 10K RAM, 48K program memory, and 
1024K flash storage [20]. The current security algorithms are 
therefore, infeasible in these sensors [38]. 
Unreliable communication: Unreliable communication is 
another serious threat to sensor security. Normally the 
packet-based routing of sensor networks is based on 
connectionless protocols and thus inherently unreliable. 
Packets may get damaged due to channel errors or may get 
dropped at highly congested nodes. Furthermore, the 
unreliable wireless communication channel may also lead to 
damaged or corrupted packets. Higher error rate also 
mandates robust error handling schemes to be implemented 
leading to higher overhead. In certain situation even if the 
channel is reliable, the communication may not be so. This is 
due to the broadcast nature of wireless communication, as the 
packets may collide in transit and may need retransmission 
[12]. 
Higher latency in communication: In a WSN, multi-hop 
routing, network congestion and processing in the 
intermediate nodes may lead to higher latency in packet 
transmission. This makes synchronization very difficult to 
achieve. The synchronization issues may sometimes be very 
critical in security as some security mechanisms may rely on 
critical event reports and cryptographic key distribution [76]. 
Unattended operation of networks: In most cases, the nodes 
in a WSN are deployed in remote regions and are left 
unattended. The likelihood that a sensor encounters a 
physical attack in such an environment is therefore, very 
high. Remote management of a WSN makes it virtually 
impossible to detect physical tampering. This makes security 
in WSNs a particularly difficult task. 
 
3. Security Requirements in WSNs 
A WSN is a special type of network. It shares some 
commonalities with a typical computer network, but also 
exhibits many characteristics which are unique to it. The 
security services in a WSN should protect the information 
communicated over the network and the resources from 
attacks and misbehavior of nodes. The most important 
security requirements in WSN are listed below: 
Data confidentiality: The security mechanism should ensure 
that no message in the network is understood by anyone 
except intended recipient. In a WSN, the issue of 
confidentiality should address the following requirements 
[27, 38]: (i) a sensor node should not allow its readings to be 
accessed by its neighbors unless they are authorized to do so, 
(ii) key distribution mechanism should be extremely robust, 
(iii) public information such as sensor identities, and public 
keys of the nodes should also be encrypted in certain cases to 
protect against traffic analysis attacks. 
Data integrity: The mechanism should ensure that no 
message can be altered by an entity as it traverses from the 
sender to the recipient.  
Availability: This requirements ensures that the services of a 
WSN should be available always even in presence of an 
internal or external attacks such as a denial of service attack 
(DoS). Different approaches have been proposed by 
researchers to achieve this goal. While some mechanisms 
make use of additional communication among nodes, others 
propose use of a central access control system to ensure 
successful delivery of every message to its recipient.  
Data freshness: It implies that the data is recent and ensures 
that no adversary can replay old messages. This requirement 
is especially important when the WSN nodes use shared-keys 
for message communication, where a potential adversary can 
launch a replay attack using the old key as the new key is 
being refreshed and propagated to all the nodes in the WSN. 
A nonce or time-specific counter may be added to each 
packet to check the freshness of the packet. 
Self-organization: Each node in a WSN should be self-
organizing and self-healing. This feature of a WSN also 
poses a great challenge to security. The dynamic nature of a 
WSN makes it sometimes impossible to deploy any pre-
installed shared key mechanism among the nodes and the 
base station [19]. A number of key pre-distribution schemes 
have been proposed in the context of symmetric encryption 
[22, 19, 44, 46]. However, for application of public-key 
cryptographic techniques an efficient mechanism for key-
distribution is very much essential. It is desirable that the 
nodes in a WSN self-organize among themselves not only for 
multi-hop routing but also to carryout key management and 
developing trust relations.  
Secure localization: In many situations, it becomes necessary 
to accurately and automatically locate each sensor node in a 
WSN. For example, a WSN designed to locate faults would 
require accurate locations of sensor nodes identifying the 
faults. A potential adversary can easily manipulate and 
provide false location information by reporting false signal 
strength, replaying messages etc. if the location information 
is not secured properly. The authors in [67] have described a 
technique called verifiable multilateration (VM). In 
multilateration, the position of a device is accurately 
computed from a series of known reference points. The 
authors have used authenticated ranging and distance 
bounding to ensure accurate location of a node. Because of 
the use of distance bounding, an attacking node can only 
increase its claimed distance from a reference point. 
However, to ensure location consistency, the attacker would 
also have to prove that its distance from another reference 
point is shorter. As it is not possible for the attacker to prove 
this, it is possible to detect the attacker. In [48], the authors 
have described a scheme called secure range-independent 
localization (SeRLoC). The scheme is a decentralized range-
independent localization scheme. It is assumed that the 
locators are trusted and cannot be compromised by any 
attacker. A sensor computes its location by listening to the 
beacon information sent by each locator which includes the 
locator’s location information. The beacon messages are 
encrypted using a shared global symmetric key that is pre-
distributed in the sensor nodes. Using the information from 
all the beacons that a sensor node receives, it computes its 
approximate location based on the coordinates of the 
locators. The sensor node then computes an overlapping 
antenna region using a majority vote scheme. The final 
location of the sensor node is determined by computing the 
center of gravity of the overlapping antenna region.  
Time synchronization: Most of the applications in sensor 
networks require time synchronization. Any security 
mechanism for WSN should also be time-synchronized. A 
collaborative WSN may require synchronization among a 
group of sensors. In [16], the authors have proposed a set of 
secure synchronization protocols for multi-hop sender-
receiver and group synchronization. 
Authentication: It ensures that the communicating node is the 
one that it claims to be. An adversary can not only modify 
data packets but also can change a packet stream by injecting 
fabricated packets. It is, therefore, essential for a receiver to 
have a mechanism to verify that the received packets have 
indeed come from the actual sender node. In case of 
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communication between two nodes, data authentication can 
be achieved through a message authentication code (MAC) 
computed from the shared secret key among the nodes. A 
number of authentication schemes for WSNs have been 
proposed by researchers. Most of these schemes are for 
secure routing and reliable packet. Some of these schemes 
will be discussed in Section 5. 
4. Security Vulnerabilities in WSNs 
Wireless Sensor Networks are vulnerable to various types of 
attacks. These attacks are mainly of three types [87]: 
Attacks on secrecy and authentication: standard 
cryptographic techniques can protect the secrecy and 
authenticity of communication channels from outsider attacks 
such as eavesdropping, packet replay attacks, and 
modification or spoofing  of packets. 
Attacks on network availability: attacks on availability of 
WSN are often referred to as denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.  
Stealthy attack against service integrity: in a stealthy attack, 
the goal of the attacker is to make the network accept a false 
data value. For example, an attacker compromises a sensor 
node and injects a false data value through that sensor node. 
In these attacks, keeping the sensor network available for its 
intended use is essential. DoS attacks against WSNs may 
permit real-world damage to the health and safety of people 
[81]. The DoS attack usually refers to an adversary’s attempt 
to disrupt, subvert, or destroy a network. However, a DoS 
attack can be any event that diminishes or eliminates a 
network’s capacity to perform its expected functions [81]. 
4.1  Denial of Service (DoS) attacks 
Wood and Stankovic have defined a DoS attack as an event 
that diminishes or attempts to reduce a network’s capacity to 
perform its expected function [81]. There are several 
standard techniques existing in the literature to cope with 
some of the more common denial of service attacks, although 
in a broader sense, development of a generic defense 
mechanism against DoS attacks is still an open problem. 
Moreover, most of the defense mechanisms require high 
computational overhead and hence not suitable for resource-
constrained WSNs. Since DoS attacks in WSNs can 
sometimes prove very costly, researchers have spent a great 
deal of effort in identifying various types of such attacks, and 
devising strategies to defend against them. Some of the 
important types of DoS attacks in WSNs are discussed 
below. 
4.1.1 Physical layer attacks 
The physical layer is responsible for frequency selection, 
carrier frequency generation, signal detection, modulation, 
and data encryption [12]. As with any radio-based medium, 
the possibility of jamming is there. In addition, nodes in 
WSNs may be deployed in hostile or insecure environments 
where an attacker has the physical access. Two types of 
attacks in physical layer are (i) jamming and (ii) tampering. 
Jamming: it is a type of attack which interferes with the radio 
frequencies that the nodes use in a WSN for communication 
[81,87]. A jamming source may be powerful enough to 
disrupt the entire network. Even with less powerful jamming 
sources, an adversary can potentially disrupt communication 
in the entire network by strategically distributing the 
jamming sources. Even an intermittent jamming may prove 
detrimental as the message communication in a WSN may be 
extremely time-sensitive [81]. 
Tampering: sensor networks typically operate in outdoor 
environments. Due to unattended and distributed nature, the 
nodes in a WSN are highly susceptible to physical attacks 
[65]. The physical attacks may cause irreversible damage to 
the nodes. The adversary can extract cryptographic keys from 
the captured node, tamper with its circuitry, modify the 
program codes or even replace it with a malicious sensor 
[61]. It has been shown that sensor nodes such as MICA2 
motes can be compromised in less than one minute time [32]. 
4.1.2 Link layer attacks 
The link layer is responsible for multiplexing of data-streams, 
data frame detection, medium access control, and error 
control [12]. Attacks at this layer include purposefully 
created collisions, resource exhaustion, and unfairness in 
allocation. 
A collision occurs when two nodes attempt to transmit on the 
same frequency simultaneously [81]. When packets collide, 
they are discarded and need to re-transmitted. An adversary 
may strategically cause collisions in specific packets such as 
ACK control messages. A possible result of such collisions is 
the costly exponential back-off. The adversary may simply 
violate the communication protocol and continuously 
transmit messages in an attempt to generate collisions. 
Repeated collisions can also be used by an attacker to cause 
resource exhaustion [81]. For example, a naïve link layer 
implementation may continuously attempt to retransmit the 
corrupted packets. Unless these retransmissions are detected 
early, the energy levels of the nodes would be exhausted 
quickly. Unfairness is a weak form of DoS attack [81]. An 
attacker may cause unfairness by intermittently using the 
above link layer attacks. In this case, the adversary causes 
degradation of real-time applications running on other nodes 
by intermittently disrupting their frame transmissions. 
4.1.3 Network layer attacks 
The network layer of WSNs is vulnerable to the different 
types of attacks such as: (i) spoofed routing information , (ii) 
selective packet forwarding, (iii) sinkhole, (iv) Sybil, (v) 
wormhole, (vi) hello flood, (vii) acknowledgment spoofing 
etc. These attacks are described briefly in the following: 
Spoofed routing information: the most direct attack against a 
routing protocol is to target the routing information in the 
network. An attacker may spoof, alter, or replay routing 
information to disrupt traffic in the network [43]. These 
disruptions include creation of routing loops, attracting or 
repelling network traffic from selected nodes, extending or 
shortening source routes, generating fake error messages, 
causing network partitioning, and increasing end-to-end 
latency. 
Selective forwarding: in a multi-hop network like a WSN, for 
message communication all the nodes need to forward 
messages accurately. An attacker may compromise a node in 
such a way that it selectively forwards some messages and 
drops others [43].  
Sinkhole: In a sinkhole attack, an attacker makes a 
compromised node look more attractive to its neighbors by 
forging the routing information [36,43,81]. The result is that 
the neighbor nodes choose the compromised node as the 
next-hop node to route their data through. This type of attack 
makes selective forwarding very simple as all traffic from a 
large area in the network would flow through the 
compromised node. 
Sybil attack: it is an attack where one node presents more that 
one identity in a network. It was originally described as an 
attack intended to defeat the objective of redundancy 
mechanisms in distributed data storage systems in peer-to-
peer networks [18]. Newsome et al describe this attack from 
the perspective of a WSN [36]. In addition to defeating 
distributed data storage systems, the Sybil attack is also 
effective against routing algorithms, data aggregation, voting, 
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fair resource allocation, and foiling misbehavior detection. 
Regardless of the target (voting, routing, aggregation), the 
Sybil algorithm functions similarly. All of the techniques 
involve utilizing multiple identities. For instance, in a sensor 
network voting scheme, the Sybil attack might utilize 
multiple identities to generate additional “votes”. Similarly, 
to attack the routing protocol, the Sybil attack would rely on 
a malicious node taking on the identity of multiple nodes, and 
thus routing multiple paths through a single malicious node. 
Wormhole: a wormhole is low latency link between two 
portions of a network over which an attacker replays network 
messages [43]. This link may be established either by a single 
node forwarding messages between two adjacent but 
otherwise non-neighboring nodes or by a pair of nodes in 
different parts of the network communicating with each 
other. The latter case is closely related to sinkhole attack as 
an attacking node near the base station can provide a one-hop 
link to that base station via the other attacking node in a 
distant part of the network.  
Hello flood: most of the protocols that use Hello packets 
make the naïve assumption that receiving such a packet 
implies that the sender is within the radio range of the 
receiver. An attacker may use a high-powered transmitter to 
fool a large number of nodes and make them believe that they 
are within its neighborhood [43]. Subsequently, the attacker 
node falsely broadcasts a shorter route to the base station, 
and all the nodes which received the Hello packets, attempt 
to transmit to the attacker node. However, these nodes are 
out of the radio range of the attacker. 
Acknowledgment spoofing: some routing algorithms for 
WSNs require transmission of acknowledgment packets. An 
attacking node may overhear packet transmissions from its 
neighboring nodes and spoof the acknowledgments thereby 
providing false information to the nodes [43]. In this way, the 
attacker is able to disseminate wrong information about the 
status of the nodes.  
4.1.4 Transport layer attacks 
The attacks that can be launched on the transport layer in a 
WSN are flooding attack and de-synchronization attack.  
Flooding: Whenever a protocol is required to maintain state 
at either end of a connection, it becomes vulnerable to 
memory exhaustion through flooding [81]. An attacker may 
repeatedly make new connection request until the resources 
required by each connection are exhausted or reach a 
maximum limit. In either case, further legitimate requests will 
be ignored. 
De-synchronization: De-synchronization refers to the 
disruption of an existing connection [81]. An attacker may, 
for example, repeatedly spoof messages to an end host 
causing the host to request the retransmission of missed 
frames. If timed correctly, an attacker may degrade or even 
prevent the ability of the end hosts to successfully exchange 
data causing them instead to waste energy attempting to 
recover from errors which never really exist. The possible 
DoS attacks and the corresponding countermeasures are 
listed in Table 1. 
4.2  Attacks on secrecy and authentication 
There are different types of attacks under this category as 
discussed below. 
4.2.1 Node replication attack 
In a node replication attack, an attacker attempts to add a 
node to an existing WSN by replication (i.e. copying) the 
node identifier of an already existing node in the network 
[56]. A node replicated and joined in the network in this 
manner can potentially cause severe disruption in message 
communication in the WSN by corrupting and forwarding the 
packets in wrong routes. This may also lead to network 
partitioning, communication of false sensor readings. In 
addition, if the attacker gains physical access to the entire 
network, it is possible for him to copy the cryptographic keys 
and use these keys for message communication from the 
replicated node. The attacker can also place the replicated 
node in strategic locations in the network so that he could 
easily manipulate a specific segment of the network, possibly 
causing a network partitioning. 
4.2.2 Attacks on privacy 
Since WSNs are capable of automatic data collection through 
efficient and strategic deployment of sensors, these networks 
are also vulnerable to potential abuse of these vast data 
sources. Privacy preservation of sensitive data in a WSN is 
particularly difficult challenge [33]. Moreover, an adversary 
may gather seemingly innocuous data to derive sensitive 
information if he knows how to aggregate data collected from 
multiple sensor nodes. This is analogous to the panda hunter 
problem, where the hunter can accurately estimate the 
location of the panda by monitoring the traffic [57]. 
Table 1. Attacks on WSNs and countermeasures 
Layer Attacks Defense 
 
Physical 
Jamming Spread-spectrum, priority 
messages, lower duty cycle, 
region mapping, mode 
change 
Collision Error-correction code 
Exhaustion Rate limitation 
 
Link 
Unfairness Small frames 
Spoofed routing information 
& selective forwarding 
Egress filtering, 
authentication, monitoring 
Sinkhole Redundancy checking 
Sybil Authentication, monitoring, 
redundancy 
Wormhole Authentication, probing 
Hello Flood Authentication, packet 
leashes by using geographic 
and temporal info 
 
Network 
Ack. flooding Authentication, bi-directional 
link authentication 
verification 
 
Transport 
Flooding 
De-synchronization 
Client puzzles 
Authentication 
Source: Y. Wang, G. Attebury, and B. Ramamurthy, IEEE Communications 
Surveys and Tutorials, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 2-23, 2006 
 
The privacy preservation in WSNs is even more challenging 
since these networks make large volumes of information 
easily available through remote access mechanisms. Since the 
adversary need not be physically present to carryout the 
surveillance, the information gathering process can be done 
anonymously with a very low risk. In addition, remote access 
allows a single adversary to monitor multiple sites 
simultaneously [6].  
Following are some of the common attacks on sensor data 
privacy [33,6]:  
Eavesdropping and passive monitoring: This is most 
common and easiest form of attack on data privacy. If the 
messages are not protected by cryptographic mechanisms, the 
adversary could easily understand the contents. Packets 
containing control information in a WSN convey more 
information than accessible through the location server, 
Eavesdropping on these messages prove more effective for 
an adversary.  
Traffic analysis: In order to make an effective attack on 
privacy, eavesdropping should be combined with a traffic 
analysis. Through an effective analysis of traffic, an 
adversary can identify some sensor nodes with special roles 
and activities in a WSN. For example, a sudden increase in 
message communication between certain nodes signifies that 
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those nodes have some specific activities and events to 
monitor. Deng et al have demonstrated two types of attacks 
that can identify the base station in a WSN without even 
underrating the contents of the packets being analyzed in 
traffic analysis [26].   
Camouflage: An adversary may compromise a sensor node in 
a WSN and later on use that node to masquerade a normal 
node in the network. This camouflaged node then may 
advertise false routing information and attract packets from 
other nodes for further forwarding. After the packets start 
arriving at the compromised node, it starts forwarding them 
to strategic nodes where privacy analysis on the packets may 
be carried out systematically.  
It may be noted from the above discussion that WSNs are 
vulnerable to a number of attacks at all layers of the TCP/IP 
protocol stack. However, as pointed out by authors in [58], 
there may be other types of attacks possible which are not yet 
identified. Securing a WSN against all these attacks may be a 
quite challenging task.  
5. Security Mechanisms for WSNs 
In this section, defense mechanism for combating various 
types of attacks on WSNs will be discussed. First, different 
cryptographic mechanisms for WSNs are presented. Both 
public key cryptography and symmetric key cryptographic 
techniques are discussed for WSN security. A number of key 
management protocols for WSNs are discussed next. Various 
methods of defending against DoS attacks, secure 
broadcasting mechanisms and various secure routing 
mechanisms are also discussed. In addition, various 
mechanisms for defending the Sybil attack, node replication 
attack, traffic analysis attacks, and attacks on sensor privacy 
are also presented. Finally, intrusion detection mechanisms 
for WSNs, secure data aggregation mechanisms and various 
trust management schemes for WSN security are discussed. 
5.1  Cryptography in WSNs  
Selecting the most appropriate cryptographic method is vital 
in WSNs as all security services are ensured by 
cryptography. Cryptographic methods used in WSNs should 
meet the constraints of sensor nodes and be evaluated by 
code size, data size, processing time, and power 
consumption. In this section, we focus on the selection of 
cryptography in WSNs. We discuss public key cryptography 
first, followed by symmetric key cryptography. 
5.1.1 Public key cryptography in WSNs 
Many researchers believe that the code size, data size, 
processing time, and power consumption make it undesirable 
for public key algorithm techniques, such as the Diffie-
Hellman key agreement protocol [45] or RSA signatures 
[98], to be employed in WSNs. 
Public key algorithms such as RSA are computationally 
intensive and usually execute thousands or even millions of 
multiplication instructions to perform a single-security 
operation. Further, a microprocessor’s public key algorithm 
efficiency is primarily determined by the number of clock 
cycles required to perform a multiplication instruction [27]. 
Brown et al found that public key algorithms such as RSA 
usually require on the order of tens of seconds and up to 
minutes to perform encryption and decryption operations in 
resource-constrained wireless devices, which exposes a 
vulnerability to DoS attacks [99]. On the other hand, Carman 
et al found that it usually takes a microprocessor thousands of 
nano-joules to do a simple multiplication function with a 
128-bit result [27]. In contrast, symmetric key cryptographic 
algorithms and hash functions consume much less 
computational energy than public key algorithms. For 
example, the encryption of a 1024-bit block consumes 
approximately 42mJ on MC68328 DragonBall processor 
using RSA, and the estimated energy consumption for a 128-
bit AES block is a much lower at 0.104 mJ [27]. 
Recent studies have shown that it is feasible to apply public 
key cryptography to sensor networks by using the right 
selection of algorithms and associated parameters, 
optimization, and low power techniques [23, 24,100]. The 
investigated public key algorithms include Rabin’s Scheme 
[101], Ntru-Encrypt [102], RSA [98], and Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC) [103,104]. Most studies in the literature 
focus on RSA and ECC algorithms. The attraction of ECC is 
that it offers equal security for a far smaller key size, thereby 
reducing processing and communication overhead. For 
example, RSA with 1024-bit keys (RSA-1024) provides a 
currently accepted level of security for many applications and 
is equivalent in strength to ECC with 160-bit keys (ECC-160) 
[105]. To protect data beyond the year 2010, RSA Security 
recommends RSA-2048 as the new minimum key size, which 
is equivalent to ECC with 224-bit keys (ECC-224) [106].  
Wander et al investigated the energy cost of authentication 
and key exchange based on RSA and ECC cryptography on 
an Atmel ATmega128 processor [100]. The ECC-based 
signature is generated and verified with the Elliptic Curve 
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [108]. The key 
exchange protocol is a simplified version of the SSL 
handshake, which involves two parties: a client initiating the 
communication and a server responding to the initiation 
[109]. The WSN is assumed to be administered by a central 
point with each sensor having a certificate signed by the 
central point’s private key using an RSA or ECC signature. 
In the handshake process, the two parties verify each other’s 
certificate and negotiate the session key to be used in the 
communication. The results have shown that ECDSA 
signatures are significantly cheaper than RSA signatures. 
Further, the ECC-based key exchange protocol outperforms 
the RSA-based key exchange protocol at the server side, and 
there is almost no difference in the energy cost for these two 
key exchange protocols at the client side. In addition, the 
relative performance advantage of ECC over RSA increases 
as the key size increases.  
The implementation of RSA and ECC cryptography on 
Mica2 [14] nodes further proved that a public key-based 
protocol is viable for WSNs. In [80], Watro et al have 
described a system named TinyPK where RSA system has 
been implemented on Mica2 motes using TinyOS 
development environment. The authors have demonstrated 
that authentication and key agreement protocol can be 
efficiently realized by this scheme in resource-constrained 
sensor nodes. Another scheme- TinyECC [110] based on 
ECC have been designed and implemented on Mica2. Similar 
work was also conducted by Malan et al on ECC 
cryptography using a Mica2 mote [45]. In their work, ECC 
was used to distribute a single symmetric key for the link 
layer encryption provided by the TinySec module [90]. 
While public key cryptography may be possible in sensor 
nodes, the private key operations are still expensive. The 
assumptions in [24,45] may not be satisfied in some 
applications. For example, the work in [24,45] concentrated 
on the public key operations only, assuming the private key 
operations will be performed by a base station or a third 
party. By selecting appropriate parameters, for example, 
using the small integer e = 216 + 1 as the public key, the 
public key operation time can be extremely fast while the 
private key operation time does not change. The limitation of 
private key operation occurring only at a base station makes 
many security services using public key algorithms not 
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available under these schemes. Such services include peer-to-
peer authentication and secure data aggregation.  
5.1.2 Symmetric key cryptography in WSNs 
Since most of the public key cryptographic mechanisms are 
computationally intensive, most of the research studies for 
WSNs focus on use of symmetric key cryptographic 
techniques. Symmetric key cryptographic mechanisms use a 
single shared key between the two communicating host which 
is used both for encryption and decryption. However, one 
major challenge for deployment of symmetric key 
cryptography is how to securely distribute the shared key 
between the two communicating hosts. This is a non-trivial 
problem since pre-distributing the key may not always be 
feasible.   
Five popular encryption schemes RC4 [111], RC5 [112], 
IDEA [111], SHA-1 [113], and MD5 [111,114], were 
evaluated on six different microprocessors ranging in word 
size from 8-bit (Atmet AVR) to 16-bit (Mitsubishi M16C) to 
32-bit widths (StrongARM, XScale) in [115]. The execution 
time and code memory size were measured for each 
algorithm and platform. The experiments indicated uniform 
cryptographic cost for each encryption class and each 
architecture class. The impact of caches was negligible while 
Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) support is limited to 
specific effects on certain algorithms. Moreover, hashing 
algorithms (MD5, SHA-1) incur higher overhead than 
encryption algorithms (RC4, RC5, and IDEA). 
In [88], Law et al evaluated two symmetric key algorithms: 
RC5 and TEA [116]. They further evaluated six block 
ciphers: RC5, RC6 [117], Rijndael [118], MISTY1 [119], 
KASUMI [120], and Camellia [121] on IAR Systems’ 
MSP430F149 in [88]. The benchmark parameters were code, 
data memory, and CPU cycles.  
Selecting the appropriate cryptography method for sensor 
nodes is fundamental to provide security services in WSNs. 
However, the decision depends on the computation and 
communication capability of the sensor nodes. Open research 
issues range from cryptographic algorithms to hardware 
design as described below. 
Recent studies on public key cryptography have 
demonstrated that public key operations may be practical in 
sensor networks. However, private key operations are still 
too expensive in terms of computation and energy cost to 
accomplish in a sensor node. The application of private key 
operations to sensor nodes needs to be studied further. 
Symmetric key cryptography is superior to public key 
cryptography in terms of speed and low energy cost. 
However, the key distribution schemes based on symmetric 
key cryptography are not perfect. Efficient and flexible key 
distribution schemes need to be designed.  
It is also likely that more powerful motes will need to be 
designed to support the increasing requirements on 
computation and communication in sensor nodes. 
5.2  Key management protocols  
The area that has received maximum attention of the 
researchers in WSN security is key management. Key 
management is a core mechanism to ensure security in 
network services and applications in WSNs. The goal of key 
management is to establish the keys among the nodes in a 
secure and reliable manner. In addition, the key management 
scheme must support node addition and revocation in the 
network. Since the nodes in a WSN have computational and 
power constraints, the key management protocols for these 
networks must be extremely light-weight. Most of the key 
management protocols for WSNs are based on symmetric key 
cryptography because public key cryptographic techniques 
are in general computationally intensive. Figure 1 presents a 
taxonomy of key management protocols in WSNs. In this 
Section, a brief overview of some of the most important key 
management protocols is given. 
5.2.1 Key management based on network structure 
Depending on the underlying network structure, the key 
management protocols in WSNs may be centralized or 
distributed. In a centralized key management scheme, there is 
only one entity that controls the generation, re-generation, 
and distribution of keys. This entity is called key distribution 
center (KDC). The only protocol existing in the literature that 
is based on centralized key distribution is the LKHW scheme 
[63]. LKHW is based on logical key hierarchy (LKH). In this 
scheme, the base station is treated as a KDC and all keys are 
logically distributed in a tree rooted at the base station. The 
main drawback of this scheme is its single point of failure. If 
the central controller fails, the entire network and its security 
will be affected. Lack of scalability is another issue. 
Moreover, it does not provide data authentication. In the 
distributed key management protocols, different controllers 
are used to manage key-related activities. These protocols do 
not have the vulnerability of single point of failure and they 
allow better scalability. Most of the key management 
protocols existing in the literature are distributed in nature. 
These schemes fall either in deterministic or in probabilistic 
categories and are discussed later in this section. 
  
Figure 1. A taxonomy of key management protocols in WSNs 
(Source: Y. Wang, G. Attebury, and B. Ramamurthy, IEEE 
Communications Surveys and Tutorials, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 2-23, 2006) 
5.2.2 Key management on probability of key sharing 
The key management protocols for WSNs may be classified 
on the probability of key sharing between a pair of sensor 
nodes. Depending of this probability the key management 
schemes may be either deterministic or probabilistic.  
5.2.2.1 Deterministic key distribution schemes 
The localized encryption and authentication protocol 
(LEAP) proposed by Zhu et al [59] is a key management 
protocol for WSNs based on symmetric key algorithms. It 
uses different keying mechanisms for different packets 
depending on their security requirements. Four types of keys 
are established for each node: (i) an individual key shared 
with the base station (pre-distributed), (ii) a group of key 
shared by all the nodes in the network (pre-distributed), (iii) 
pair-wise key shared with immediate neighbor nodes, and 
(iv) a cluster key shared with multiple neighbor nodes. The 
pair-wise keys shared with immediate neighbor nodes are 
used to protect peer-to-peer communication and the cluster 
key is used for local broadcast.  
It is assumed that the time required to attack a node is greater 
than the network establishment time, during which a node 
can detect all its intermediate neighbors. A common initial 
key is loaded into each node before deployment. Each node 
derives a master key which depends on the common key and 
its unique identifier. Nodes then exchange Hello messages, 
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which are authenticated by the receivers (since the common 
key ad identifier are known, the master key of the neighbor 
can be computed). The nodes then compute a shared key 
based on their master keys. The common key is erased in all 
nodes after the establishment, and by assumption, no node 
has been compromised up to this point. Sine no adversary 
can get the common key, it is impossible to inject false data 
or decrypt the earlier exchange messages. Also, no node can 
later forge the master key of any other node. In this way, 
pair-wise shared keys are established between all immediate 
neighbors. The cluster key is established by a node after the 
pair-wise key establishment. A node generates a cluster key 
and sends it encrypted to each neighbor with its pair-wise 
shared key. The group key can be pre-loaded, but should be 
updated once any compromised node is detected. This could 
be done, in a naïve way, the base station’s sending the new 
group key to each node using its individual key, or a hop-by-
hop basis using cluster keys. Other sophisticated algorithms 
have been proposed for the same. Further, the authors have 
proposed methods for establishing shared keys between 
multi-hop neighbors.  
Lai et al have proposed a broadcast session key (BROSK) 
negotiation protocol [122]. BROSK assumes a master key 
shared by all the nodes in the network. To establish a session 
key with its neighbor node B, a sensor node A broadcasts a 
key negotiation message and both arrive at a shared session 
key. BROSK is a scalable and energy-efficient protocol. 
Camete and Yener have proposed a deterministic key 
distribution scheme for WSNs using combinatorial design 
theory [123]. The combinatorial design theory based pair-
wise key pre-distribution (CDTKeying) scheme is based on 
block design techniques in combinatorics. It employs 
symmetric and generalized quadrangle design techniques. 
The scheme uses a finite projective plane of order n (for 
prime power of n) to generate a symmetric design with 
parameters n2 + n + 1, n + 1, 1. The design supports n2 + n + 
1 nodes and uses a key pool of size n2 + n +1. It generates n2 
+ n + 1 key chains of size n + 1 where every pair of key 
chains has exactly one key in common, and every key 
appears in exactly n + 1 key-chains. After the deployment, 
every pair of nodes finds exactly one common key. Thus, the 
probability of key sharing among a pair of sensor nodes is 
unity. The disadvantage of this proposition is that the 
parameter n has to be a prime power. Therefore, all network 
sizes can be supported for a fixed key chain size. 
Lee and Stinson proposed two combinatorial design theory 
based deterministic schemes: ID-based one-way function 
scheme (IOS) and deterministic multiple space Bloms’ 
scheme (DMBS) [124]. They further discussed the use of 
combinatorial set systems in the design of deterministic key 
pre-distribution schemes for WSNs in [125]. 
Chan and Perrig have proposed a deterministic key 
management protocol to facilitate key establishment between 
every pair of neighboring nodes in a WSN [94]. In the 
mechanism, known as peer intermediaries for key 
establishment (PIKE), all N sensor nodes are organized into a 
two-dimensional space as in Figure 2, where the coordinate 
of each node is (x, y) for x, y ε {0, 1,.. √N – 1}. Each node 
shares unique pair-wise keys with 2(√N – 1) nodes that have 
the same x or y coordinate in the two-dimensional space. For 
two nodes with no common coordinate, an intermediate node, 
which has a common x or y coordinate with both nodes, is 
used as a router to forward a key from them. However, the 
communication overhead of the scheme is rather high 
because the secure connectivity is only 2 / √N, which means 
that each node must establish a key for almost each of its 
neighbors through multi-link paths. 
 
 
  
Figure 2.   PIKE scheme 
 
Huang et al [25] have proposed a hybrid key establishment 
scheme that exploits the difference in computational and 
energy between a sensor node and the base station in a WSN. 
The authors argue that an individual sensor node possesses 
far less computational power and energy than a base station. 
In light of this, they propose placing the major cryptographic 
computations on the base station. On the sensor side, light-
weight symmetric-key operations are deployed. The sensors 
and the base station authenticate based on elliptic curve 
cryptography. The proposed mechanism also uses certificates 
to establish the legitimacy of a public key. The certificates 
are based on an elliptic curve scheme. Such certificates are 
useful to verify the authenticity of sensor nodes.  
Zhou and Fang [126] have developed a scalable key 
agreement protocol that uses a t-degree (k + 1)-variate 
symmetric polynomial to establish keys in a deterministic 
way. 
5.2.2.2 Probabilistic key distribution schemes 
Most of the key management protocols for WSNs are 
probabilistic and distributed schemes. Eschenauer and Gligor 
have proposed a random key pre-distribution scheme for 
WSNs that relies on probabilistic key sharing among nodes 
of a random graph [19]. The mechanism has three phases: 
key pre-distribution, shared key discovery, and path key 
establishment. In the key pre-distribution phase, each sensor 
is equipped with a key ring stored in its memory. The key 
ring consists of k keys which are randomly drawn from a 
large pool of P keys. The association information of the key 
identifiers in the key ring and sensor identifier is also stored 
at the base station. Each sensor node shares a pair-wise key 
with the base station. In the shared key discovery phase, each 
sensor discovers its neighbors with which it shares keys. The 
authors have suggested two methods for this purpose. The 
simplest method is for each node to broadcast a list of 
identifiers of the keys in their key rings in plaintext allowing 
neighboring nodes to check whether they share a key. 
However, the adversary may observe the key-sharing patterns 
among sensors in this way. The second method uses the 
challenge-response technique to hide key-sharing patterns 
among nodes from an adversary. Finally, in the path key 
establishment phase, a path key is assigned for those sensor 
nodes within the communication range and not sharing a key, 
but connected by two or more links at the end of the second 
phase. If a node is compromised, the base station can send a 
message to all other sensors to revoke the compromised 
node’s key ring. Re-keying follows the same procedure as 
revocation. The messages from the base station are signed by 
the pair-wise key shared by the base station and sensor nodes, 
thus ensuring that no adversary can forge a station. If a node 
is compromised, the attacker has a probability of 
approximately k/P to attack any link successfully. Because k 
<< P, it only affects a small number of sensor nodes. 
Eschenauer and Gligor’s work can be considered as the basic 
random key management scheme. A number of additional 
  
International Journal of Communication Networks and Information Security (IJCNIS)                                   Vol. 1, No. 2, August 2009 
 
62 
key pre-distribution schemes have been proposed 
[9,22,46,127,129,130]. 
In the basic random key management scheme, any two 
neighbor nodes need to find a single common key from their 
key rings to establish a secure link in the key setup phase. 
However, Chan et al observed that increasing the amount of 
key overlap in the key ring can increase the resilience of the 
network against node capture [22]. The authors have 
proposed q-composite random key pre-distribution scheme. 
It is required to share at least q common keys in the key setup 
phase to build a secure link between any two neighbor nodes. 
Further, they introduced a key update phase to enhance the 
basic random key management scheme. Suppose A has a 
secure link to B after the key setup phase and the secure key 
is k from the key pool P. Since k may be residing in the key 
ring memory of some other nodes in the network, the security 
of the link between A and B is jeopardized if any of those 
nodes are captured. Thus, it is better to update the 
communication key between A and B instead of using a key 
in the key pool. To address this problem, the authors have 
presented a multi-path key reinforcement for the key update. 
An adversary in this case has to eavesdrop on all the disjoint 
paths between node A and node B if he wants to reconstruct 
the communication key. The security of the scheme is further 
augmented by a random pair-wise key management scheme 
for node-to-node authentication.  
To discover whether the key sets of two nodes have an 
intersection, usually both nodes need to broadcast their key 
indices or find common keys through a challenge-response 
procedure. Such methods have very high communication 
overhead. De Pietro et al [127] improved the basic random 
key management scheme by associating the key indices of a 
node with its identity. For example, each node is assigned a 
pseudo-random number generator g(x, y) and the key indices 
for the node are computed as g(ID, i) for i = 1, 2,….N, where 
ID is the node identity. In this way, other nodes can find out 
which key is in its key set by checking its node identity.  
Blundo et al presented a polynomial-based key pre-
distribution protocol for group key pre-distribution that can 
be adapted to WSNs [131]. The key setup server randomly 
generates a bivariate t-degree polynomial defined as: 
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over a finite field Ғq, where q is a prime that is large enough 
to accommodate a cryptographic key. By choosing aij = aji, a 
symmetric polynomial is arrived at, i.e. f(x, y) = f(y, x). Each 
sensor node is assumed to have a unique, integer-valued, 
non-zero identity. For each sensor node u, a polynomial share 
f(u, y) is assigned, which means the coefficients of univariate 
polynomials f(u, y) are loaded into the node u’s memory. 
When nodes u and v need to establish a shared key, they 
broadcast heir IDs. Subsequently, node u can compute f(u, v) 
by evaluating f(u, y) at y = v, and node v can also compute 
f(v, u) by evaluating f(v, y) at y = u. Due to the polynomial 
symmetry, the shared key between nodes u and v has been 
established as  Kuv = f(u, v) = f(v, u). A t-degree bivariate 
polynomial is also (t + 1)-secure. Therefore, an adversary 
must compromise no less than (t + 1) nodes holding the 
shares of the same polynomial to reconstruct it.  
Liu and Ning have proposed a polynomial pool-based key 
pre-distribution (PPKP) scheme in [46]. The scheme also 
involves three phases: setup, direct key establishment, and 
path key establishment. In the setup phase, the setup server 
randomly generates a set F of bivariate t-degree polynomials 
over the finite field Ғq. For each sensor node, the setup server 
picks up a subset of polynomials FFi ⊆ and assigns the 
polynomial shares of these polynomials to node i. In the 
direct key establishment stage, the sensor nodes finds a 
shared polynomial with other sensor nodes and then establish 
a pair-wise key using the polynomial-based key pre-
distribution scheme discussed in [131]. The path key 
establishment phase is similar to that in the basic random key 
management scheme. Further, the proposed framework 
allows for the study of multiple instantiations, the key pre-
distribution scheme based on random subset assignment and 
the grid-based key pre-distribution scheme, are also 
presented and analyzed in the paper. 
Du et al have presented a multiple-space key pre-distribution 
(MSKP) scheme [9] which uses Blom’s method [49]. The 
key difference between the schemes proposed in [46] and [9] 
is that the scheme in [46] is based on a set of bivariate t-
degree polynomials, while the scheme in [9] is based on 
Blom’s method. The proposed scheme allows any pair of 
nodes in a network to be able to find a pair-wise secret key. 
As long as no more than λ nodes are compromised, the 
network is perfectly secure. To use Blom’s method, during 
the pre-deployment phase, the base station first constructs a 
(λ + 1) x N matrix G over a finite field GF(q), where N is the 
size of the network and G is considered to be public 
information. Then the base station creates a random (λ + 1) x 
(λ + 1) symmetric matrix D over GF(q), and computes an N x 
(λ + 1) matrix A = (D . G)T, where (D . G)T is the transpose of 
D. G. Matrix D needs to be kept secret, and should not be 
disclosed to adversaries.  It is easy to verify that A . G is a 
symmetric matrix as follows. 
A . G  =  (D . G)T . G  =  GT . DT . G  =  GT . D . G  = (A . G)T 
Therefore, Kij = Kji. The idea is to use Kij (or Kji) as the pair-
wise key between node i and node j. To carry out the above 
computation, in the pre-distribution phase for any sensor 
node k the following two steps are carried out: (i) the k-th 
row of matrix A is stored at node k, and (ii) the k-th column 
of matrix G is stored at node k. Then nodes i and j need to 
find the pair-wise key between them, they first exchange their 
columns of G, and then compute Kij and Kji, respectively, 
using their private rows of A. 
In the proposed scheme, each sensor node is loaded with G 
and τ distinct D matrices drawn from a large pool of ω 
symmetric matrices D1,….. Dω of size (λ + 1) x (λ + 1). For 
each Di, calculate the matrix Ai = (Di . G)T and store the j-th 
row of Ai at this node. After deployment, each node needs to 
discover whether it shares any space with neighbors. If they 
found out that they have a common space, the nodes can 
follow Blom’s method to build a pair-wise key. The scheme 
is scalable and flexible. Moreover, it is substantially more 
resilient against node capture as compared to the scheme 
proposed in [46]. 
In the above scheme, each sensor node needs to keep many 
key materials such that a pair of nodes shares a key with a 
probability that can guarantee that the entire network is 
almost connected. This causes a large storage overhead on 
memory-constrained sensor nodes. Hwang and Kim [44] 
proposed to enhance the basic random key management 
protocol [19] by reducing the amount of key-related materials 
required to be stored in each node, while guaranteeing a 
certain probability of sharing a key between two nodes. Their 
idea is to guarantee secure connectivity in the largest sub-
component of the network rather than the entire network. The 
probability that two nodes have a key in common is reduced, 
but it is still large enough for the largest network component 
to be connected.  
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Hwang et al extended the basic random key management 
scheme and proposed a cluster key grouping scheme [130]. 
They further analyzed the trade-offs involved between 
energy, memory, and security robustness. 
In all the key management schemes discussed so far, the key 
materials are uniformly distributed in the entire terrain of a 
network. The uniform distribution makes the probability that 
two neighbor nodes share a direct key, called secure 
connectivity, rather small. Therefore, a lot of communication 
overhead is inevitable for the establishment of indirect keys. 
If some location information is known, two nearby sensor 
nodes can be preloaded with the same set of key materials. In 
this way, secure connectivity may be improved. 
In the location-based key pre-distribution (LBKP) scheme 
[132], the entire WSN is divided into many square cells. 
Each cell is associated with a unique t-degree bivariate 
polynomial. Each sensor node is pre-loaded with shares of 
the polynomials of its home cell and four other cells 
horizontally and vertically adjoining its home cells. After 
deployment, any two neighbor nodes can establish a pair-
wise key if they have shares of the same polynomial. For 
example, in Figure 3, polynomial of cell C33 is also assigned 
to cells C32, C34, C23, and C43. The polynomials of other cells 
are assigned in the same way. As a result, a node in C33 has 
some polynomial information in common with other nodes in 
the shaded areas. 
Du et al have also proposed a key pre-distribution scheme 
that uses network deployment knowledge. In the proposed 
scheme, the entire network is divided into many square cells. 
Each cell is assigned a subset key pool Sij, i = 1,….u and j = 
1,….v out of a global key pool S. Those subset key pools are 
set up such that the key pools of two neighbor cells will share 
a portion of keys. In each cell, the basic random key 
management scheme [19] is applied. Using deployment 
knowledge to achieve the same connectivity, the size of the 
key ring that one node holds in this scheme is much less than 
that in the basic random key management scheme. This 
reduces the storage overhead significantly.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.  LBKP scheme 
 
Some of the above-mentioned key management schemes for 
WSNs are classified and compared in Table 2. 
Although a number of key management protocols have been 
proposed for WSNs, the design of key management protocols 
is still largely open to research. Some of the open research 
issues are discussed below.  
Memory: High security and lower overhead are two 
objectives that a key management protocol needs to achieve. 
Although there have been several proposals for key 
establishment in sensor networks, they can hardly address 
these two requirements. Strong security protocols usually 
require large amounts of memory cost, as well as high-speed 
processors and large power consumption. However, they 
cannot be easily supported due to the constraints on hardware 
resources of the sensor platform. It is well known that in 
wireless environment, transmission of one bit can consume 
more energy than computing one bit. In key management 
protocols, direct key establishment does not require 
communication or only a few rounds of one-hop 
communication, but indirect key establishment is performed 
over multi-hop communication. To reduce the multi-hop 
communication overhead, high secure connectivity, which is 
the probability of direct key establishment between a pair of 
nodes, is desirable. However, highly secure connectivity 
requires more key materials in each node, which is usually 
impractical, especially when the network size is large. 
Considering the above two issues, memory cost can be a 
major bottleneck in designing key management protocols in a 
WSN. How to reduce memory cost while still maintaining a 
certain level of security is a very important issue. 
End-to-end security: The major merit of symmetric key 
cryptography is its computational efficiency. However, most 
of the current symmetric key schemes for WSNs aim at the 
link layer security- not the transport layer security- because it 
is impractical for each node to store a transport layer key for 
each of the other nodes in a network due to huge number of 
nodes. However, end-to-end communication at the transport 
layer is very common in many WSN applications. For 
example, to reduce unnecessary traffic, a fusion node can 
aggregate reports from many source nodes and forward a 
final report to the sink node. During this procedure, the 
reports between source nodes and the fusion node and the 
one between the fusion node and the sink node should be 
secured. In hostile environments, however, any node can be 
compromised. Of one of the intermediate nodes along a route 
is compromised, the message delivered along the route can 
be exposed or modified by the compromised node. 
Employing end-to-end security can effectively prevent 
message tampering by any malicious intermediate node. 
Compared with symmetric key technology, public key 
cryptography is expensive but has flexible manageability and 
supports end-to-end security. A more promising approach to 
key establishment in WSNs is to combine the merits of both 
symmetric key and public key techniques, in that each node is 
equipped with a public key system and relies on it to 
establish end-to-end symmetric keys with other nodes. To 
achieve this goal, a critical issue is to develop more efficient 
public key algorithms and their implementations so that they 
can be widely used on sensor platforms. How to prove the 
authenticity of public keys is another important problem. A 
malicious node can otherwise, impersonate any normal node 
by claiming its public key. Identity-based cryptography is a 
shortcut to avoid the problem. Currently, most identity-based 
cryptographic algorithms operate on elliptic curve-fields, and 
pairing over elliptic curves is widely used in the 
establishment of identity-based symmetric keys. However, 
the pairing operation is very costly, comparable to or even 
more expensive than RSA. Therefore, fast algorithms and 
implementations are the major tasks for the researchers. 
Efficient symmetric key algorithms: There is still a demand 
for the development of more efficient symmetric key 
algorithms because encryption and authentication based on 
symmetric keys are very frequent in the security operations of 
sensor nodes. For example, in the link layer security protocol 
TinySec [90], each packet must be authenticated, and 
encryption can also be triggered if critical packets are 
transmitted. Therefore, fast and cost-efficient symmetric key 
algorithms should be developed. 
Key update and revocation: Once a key has been established 
between two nodes, the key can act as a master key and be 
used to derive different sub-keys for many purposes (e.g., 
encryption and authentication0. If each key is used for a long 
time, it may be exposed due to cryptanalysis over the ciphers 
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Table 2 Classification of key management protocols [97] 
 
intercepted by adversaries. To protect the master key and 
those sub-keys from cryptanalysis, it is wise to update keys 
periodically. The period of update, however, is difficult to 
choose. Because the cryptanalysis capability of adversaries is 
unknown, it is very difficult to estimate how long it takes for 
adversaries to expose a key by cryptanalysis. If the key 
update period is too long, the corresponding key may also be 
exposed. If it is too short, frequent updates can incur large 
overhead. A related problem is key revocation. If one node is 
detected to be malicious, its key must be revoked. However, 
key revocation has not been thoroughly investigated. 
Although Chan et al [96] proposed a distributed revocation 
protocol, it is only based on the random pair-wise key 
scheme [22], and cannot easily be generalized into other key 
establishment protocols. 
Node compromise: Node compromise is the most detrimental 
attack on sensor networks. Because compromised nodes have 
all the authentic  key materials, hey can result in very severe 
damage to WSN applications and cannot be detected easily. 
How to counteract node compromise remains an open 
problem. Most of the current security protocols attempt to 
defend the impact of node compromise through careful 
protocol design such that the impact of node compromise can 
be restricted to a small area. However, a hardware approach 
is more promising. With advances in hardware design and 
manufacturing techniques, much stronger, tamper-resistant, 
and cheaper devices can be installed on the sensor platform 
all the authentic key materials, hey can result in very severe 
damage to WSN applications and cannot be detected easily. 
How to counteract node compromise remains an open 
problem. Most of the current security protocols attempt to 
defend the impact of node compromise through careful 
protocol design such that the impact of node compromise can 
be restricted to a small area. However, a hardware approach 
is more promising. With advances in hardware design and 
manufacturing techniques, much stronger, tamper-resistant, 
and cheaper devices can be installed on the sensor platform 
to counteract node compromise. 
5.3  Defense against DoS attacks  
Various types of DoS attacks in WSNs have been discussed 
in Section 4. In this section, defense mechanisms for each of 
those attacks are presented in detail. 
5.3.1 Defense in the physical layer 
Jamming attack may be defended by employing variations of 
spread-spectrum communication such as frequency hopping 
and code spreading [81]. Frequency-hopping spread 
spectrum (FHSS) is a method of transmitting signals by 
rapidly switching a carrier among many frequency channels 
using a pseudo-random sequence known to both the 
transmitter and the receiver. As a potential attacker would not 
be able to predict the frequency selection sequence, it will be 
impossible for him to jam the frequency being used at a given 
point of time.  Code spreading is another technique for 
defending against jamming. However, it requires greater 
design complexity and energy and thus not very suitable for 
WSNs. In general, to maintain low cost and low power 
requirements, sensor devices are limited to single-frequency 
use and are therefore highly susceptible to jamming attacks. 
One approach for tolerance against jamming attack in a WSN 
is to identify the jammed part of the network and effectively 
avoid it by routing around. Wood and Stankovic [81] have 
proposed an approach where the nodes along the perimeter of 
a jammed region report their status to the neighbors and  
collectively  the affected region is identified and packets are 
routed around it. 
5.3.2 Defense in the link layer 
A typical defense against collision attack is the use of error-
correcting codes [81]. Most codes work best with low levels 
of collisions such as those caused by environmental or 
probabilistic errors. However, these codes also add additional 
processing and communication overhead. It is reasonable to 
assume that an attacker will always be bale to corrupt more 
than what can be corrected. Although it is possible to detect 
these malicious collisions, no complete defense mechanism 
against them is kwon today. 
A possible solution for energy exhaustion attack is to apply a 
rate limiting MAC admission control. This would allow the 
network to ignore those requests that intend to exhaust the 
energy reserves of a node. A second technique is to use time-
division multiplexing where each node is allotted a time slot 
in which it can transmit [81]. This eliminates the need of 
arbitration for each frame and can solve the indefinite 
postponement problem in a back-off algorithm. However, it 
is still susceptible to collisions.  
The effect of unfairness caused by an attacker by launching a 
link layer attack can be lessened by use of small frames since 
it reduces the amount of time an attacker gets at his disposal 
to capture the communication channel [81]. However, this 
technique often reduces efficiency and is susceptible to 
further unfairness as an attacker may try to retransmit quickly 
instead of waiting for a random time interval. 
5.3.3 Defense in the network layer 
A countermeasure against spoofing and alteration is to 
append a message authentication code (MAC) after the 
message. By adding a MAC to the message, the receivers can 
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verify whether the messages have been spoofed or altered. To 
defend against replayed information, counters or time-stamps 
may be introduced in the messages [38]. A possible defense 
against selective forwarding attack is using multiple paths to 
send data [43]. A second defense is to detect the malicious 
node or assume it has failed and seek an alternative route. 
Hu et al have proposed a novel and generic mechanism called 
packet leashes for detecting and defending against wormhole 
attacks [15]. In a wormhole attack, a malicious node 
eavesdrops on a series of packets, then tunnels them through 
a path in the network, and replays them. This is done in order 
to make a false representation of the distance between the 
two colluding nodes. It is also used, more generally, to 
disrupt the routing protocol by misleading the neighbor 
discovery process [43]. Hu et al have presented a mechanism 
that employs directional antenna to combat wormhole attack 
[35]. Wang and Bhargava have used a visualization approach 
to detect wormholes in a WSN [66]. In the mechanism 
proposed by the authors, a distance estimation is made 
between all the sensor nodes in a neighborhood. Using multi-
dimensional scaling, a virtual layout of the network is then 
computed, and a surface smoothing strategy is used to adjust 
the round-off errors. Finally, the shape of the resulting virtual 
network is analyzed. If any wormhole exists, the shape of the 
network will bend and curve towards the wormhole, 
otherwise the network will appear flat.  
To defend against flooding DoS attack at the transport layer, 
Aura et al have proposed a mechanism using client puzzles 
[3]. The main idea is that each connecting client should 
demonstrate its commitment to the connection by solving a 
puzzle. As an attacker in most likelihood, does not have 
infinite resource, it will be impossible for him to create new 
connections fast enough to cause resource starvation on the 
serving node.  
A possible defense against de-synchronization attack on the 
transport layer is to enforce a mandatory requirement of 
authentication of all packets communicated between nodes 
[81]. If the authentication mechanism is secure, an attacker 
will be unable to send any spoofed messages to any 
destination node.  
Some mechanisms for secure multicasting and broadcasting 
in WSNs are discussed in the following sub-section. 
5.3.3.1 Secure broadcasting and multicasting protocols 
Multicasting and broadcasting techniques are used primarily 
to reduce the communication and management overhead of 
sending a single message to multiple receivers. In order to 
ensure that only legitimate group members receive the 
multicast and broadcast communication, appropriate 
authentication and encryption mechanisms must be in place. 
To handle this problem, several key management schemes 
have been devised: centralized group key management 
protocols, decentralized key management protocols, and 
distributed key management protocols [78]. First, we will 
discuss some generic security mechanisms for multicast and 
broadcast communication in wireless networks. Then we will 
present some of the well-known propositions specific to 
WSNs. 
In the case of the centralized group key management 
protocols, a central authority is used to maintain the group. 
Decentralized management protocols, however, divide the 
task of group management amongst multiple nodes. In 
distributed key management protocols, the key management 
activity is distributed among a set of nodes rather than on a 
single node. In some cases, the entire group of nodes is 
responsible for key management [78]. 
An efficient way to distribute keys in a network is to use a 
logical key tree. Such techniques essentially fall under the 
category of centralized key management protocols. Some 
schemes have been developed for WSNs based on logical 
key tree technique [63,42,91]. While centralized solutions are 
not always the most efficient ones, these mechanisms may 
sometimes be very effective for WSNs, as relatively heavier 
computations can be usually carried out in powerful base 
stations. 
Di Pietro et al have proposed a directed diffusion-based 
multicast mechanism for WSNs that utilizes a logical key 
hierarchy [63]. In the logical hierarchy, a central key 
distributor is at the root of a tree, and the nodes in the 
network are the leaf level. The internal nodes of tree contain 
keys that are used in the re-keying process. The directed 
diffusion is an energy-efficient data dissemination technique 
for WSNs [40]. In directed diffusion, a query is transformed 
into an interest and then diffused throughout the network. 
The source node then starts collecting data from the network 
based on the propagated interest. The dissemination 
technique also sets up certain gradients designed to draw 
events toward the interest. The collected data is then sent 
back to the source along the reverse path of the interest 
propagation. The directed diffusion-based logical key 
hierarchy scheme as proposed by Di Pietro et al allows nodes 
to join and leave groups. The key hierarchy is used to 
effectively re-establish keys for the nodes below the node 
that has left the group. When a node declares its intension to 
join a group, a key set is generated for the new node based on 
the keys within the existing key hierarchy.  
Kaya et al discuss the problem of multicast group 
management in [89]. In their proposition, the nodes in a 
network are grouped based on their locality and a security 
tree is constructed on the groups.  
Lazos and Poovendran have presented a tree-based key 
distribution scheme that is similar to the directed diffusion-
based logical key hierarchy proposed by Di Pietro et al [91]. 
In their proposed scheme, a routing-aware tree is constructed 
in which the leaf nodes are assigned keys based on all relay 
nodes above them. As the scheme takes advantage of routing 
information for construction the key hierarchy, it is more 
energy-efficient than routing schemes that arbitrarily arrange 
nodes into a routing tree. The authors have also proposed a 
greedy routing-aware key distribution algorithm.  
In [42], the authors have proposed a mechanism that uses 
geographic location information (e.g. GPS data) for 
construction of a logical key hierarchy for secure multicast 
communication. The nodes, based on the geographical 
location information, are grouped into different clusters. The 
nodes within a cluster are able to reach each other with a 
single hop communication. Using the cluster information, a 
key hierarchy is constructed in a manner similar to that 
proposed in [91]. 
5.4  Defense against attacks on routing protocols  
Many routing protocols have been proposed for WSNs. 
These protocols can be divided into three broad categories 
according to the network structure: (i) flat-based routing, (ii) 
hierarchical-based routing, and (iii) location-based routing 
[133]. In flat-based routing, all nodes are typically assigned 
equal roles or functionality. In hierarchical-based routing, 
nodes play different roles in the network. In location-based 
routing, sensor node positions are used to route data in the 
network. One common location-based routing protocol is 
GPSR [50]. It allows nodes to send packets to a region rather 
than a particular node. All these routing protocols are 
vulnerable to various types of attacks such as selective 
forwarding, sinkhole attack etc as mentioned in Section 4.  
An elaborate discussion on various types of attacks on the 
routing protocols in WSNs is given in [43]. 
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The goal of a secure routing protocol for a WSN is to ensure 
the integrity, authentication, and availability of messages. 
Most of the existing secure routing algorithms for WSNs are 
all based on symmetric key cryptography except the work in 
[134], which is based on public key cryptography. In the 
following, a number of security mechanisms for routing in 
WSNs are discussed in detail. 
µTESLA (the “micro” version of the Timed, Efficient, 
Streaming, Loss-tolerant Authentication protocol) [77] and 
its extensions [37,51] have been proposed to provide 
broadcast authentication for sensor networks. µTESLA is 
broadcast authentication protocol which was proposed by 
Perrig et al for the SPINS protocol [38]. µTESLA introduces 
asymmetry through a delayed disclosure of symmetric keys 
resulting in an efficient broadcast authentication scheme. For 
its operation, it requires the base station and the sensor nodes 
to be loosely synchronized. In addition, each node must know 
an upper bound on the maximum synchronization error.  
To send an authenticated packet, the base station simply 
computes a MAC on the packet with a key that is secret at 
that point of time. When a node gets a packet, it can verify 
that the corresponding MAC key was not yet disclosed by the 
base station. Because a receiving node is assured that the 
MAC key is known only to the base station, the receiving 
node is assured that no adversary could have altered the 
packet in transit. The node stores the packet in a buffer. At 
the time of key disclosure, the base station broadcasts the 
verification key to all its receivers. When a node receives the 
disclosed key, it can easily verify the correctness of the key. 
If the key is correct, the node can now use it to authenticate 
the packet stored in its buffer. 
Each MAC is a key from the key chain, generated by a public 
one-way function F. To generate the one-way key chain, the 
sender chooses the last key Kn from the chain, and repeatedly 
applies F to compute all other keys: Ki = F(Ki+1). 
Figure 4 shows an example of µTESLA. The receiver node is 
loosely time synchronized and knows K0 in an authenticated 
way. Packets P1 and P2 sent in interval 1 contain a MAC with 
a key K1. Packet P3 has a MAC using key K2. If P4, P5, and 
P6 are all lost, as well as the packet that disclosed the key K1, 
the receiver cannot authenticate P1, P2, and P3. In interval 4, 
the base station broadcasts the key K2, which the nodes 
authenticate by verifying K0 = F(F(K2)), and hence know also 
K1 = F(K2), so they can authenticate packets P1, P2 with K1, 
and P3 with K2. SPINS limits the broadcasting capability to 
only the base station. If a node wants to broadcast 
authenticated data, the node has to broadcast the data through 
the base station. The data is first sent to the base station in an 
authenticated way. It is then broadcasted by the base station. 
To bootstrap a new receiver, µTESLA depends on a point-to-
point authentication mechanism in which a receiver sends a 
request message to the base station and the base station 
replies with a message containing all the necessary 
parameters. It may be noted that µTESLA requires the base 
station to unicast initial parameters to individual sensor 
nodes, and thus incurs a long delay to boot up a large-scale 
sensor network. Liu and Ning have proposed a multi-level 
key chain scheme for broadcast authentication to overcome 
this deficiency [37,51].  
 
 
Figure 4.  Time-released key chain for source authentication 
(Source: Source: Y. Wang, G. Attebury, and B. Ramamurthy, IEEE 
Communications Surveys and Tutorials, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 2-23, 2006) 
The basic idea in [37,51] is to predetermine and broadcast 
the initial parameters required by µTESLA instead of using 
unicast-based message transmission. The simplest way is to 
pre-distribute the µTESLA parameters with a master key 
during the initialization of the sensor nodes. As a result, all 
sensor nodes have the key chain commitments and other 
necessary parameters once they are initialized, and are ready 
to use µTESLA as long as the staring time has passed. 
Furthermore, the authors have introduced a multi-level key 
chain scheme, in which the higher key chains are used to 
authenticate the commitments of the lower-level ones. 
However, the multi-level key chain suffers from possible 
DoS attacks during commitment distribution stage. Further, 
none of the µTESLA or multi-level key chain schemes is 
scalable in terms of the number of senders. In [135], a 
practical broadcast authentication protocol has been 
proposed to support a potentially large number of broadcast 
senders using µTESLA as a building block. 
µTESLA provides broadcast authentication for base stations, 
but is not suitable for local broadcast authentication. This is 
because µTESLA does not provide immediate authentication. 
For every received packet, a node has to wait for one 
µTESLA interval to receive the MAC key used in computing 
the MAC for the packet. As a result, if µTESLA is used for 
local broadcast authentication, a message traversing l hops 
will take at least l µTESLA intervals to arrive at the 
destination. In addition, a sensor node has to buffer all 
unverified packets. Both the latency and the storage 
requirements limit the scheme for authenticating infrequent 
messages broadcast by the base station. Zhu et al have 
proposed a one-way key chain scheme for one-hop broadcast 
authentication [59]. The mechanism is known as LEAP. In 
this scheme, every node generates a one-way key chain of 
certain length and then transmits the commitment (i.e., first 
key) of the key chain to each neighbor, encrypted with their 
pair-wise shared key. Whenever a node has a message to 
send, it attaches to the message to the next authenticated key 
in the key chain. The authenticated keys are disclosed in 
reverse order to their generation. A receiving neighbor can 
verify the message based on the commitment or an 
authenticated key it received from the sending node more 
recently.  
Deng et al have proposed an intrusion tolerant routing 
protocol in wireless sensor networks (INENS) that adopts a 
routing-based approach to security in WSNs [28]. It 
constructs routing tables in each node, bypassing malicious 
nodes in the network. The protocol can not totally rule out 
attack on nodes, but it minimizes the damage caused to the 
network. The computation, communication, storage, and 
bandwidth requirements at the nodes are reduced, but at the 
cost of greater computation and communication at the base 
station. To prevent DoS attacks, individual nodes are not 
allowed to broadcast to the entire network. Only the base 
station is allowed to broadcast, and the base station is 
authenticated using one-way hash function so as to prevent as 
possible masquerading by a malicious node. Control 
information pertaining to routing is authenticated by the base 
station in order to prevent injection of false routing data. The 
base station computes and disseminates routing tables, since 
it does not have computational and energy constraints. Even 
if an intruder takes over a node and does not forward packets, 
INSENS uses redundant multi-path routing, so that the 
destination can still reach without passing through the 
malicious node. 
INSENS has two phases: route discovery and data 
forwarding. During the route discovery phase, the base 
station sends a request message to all nodes in the network by 
multi-hop forwarding. Any node receiving a request message 
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records the identity of the sender and sends the message to all 
its immediate neighbors if it has not already done so. 
Subsequent request messages are used to identify the senders 
as neighbors, but repeated flooding is not performed. The 
nodes respond with their local topology by sending feedback 
messages. The integrity of the messages is protected using 
encryption by a shared key mechanism. A malicious node can 
inflict damage only by not forwarding packets, but the 
messages are sent through different neighbors, so it is likely 
that it reaches a node by at least one path. Hence, the effect 
of malicious nodes is not totally eliminated, but it is 
restricted to only a few downstream nodes in the worst case. 
Malicious nodes may also send spurious messages and cause 
battery drain for a few downstream nodes. Finally, the base 
station calculates forwarding tables for all nodes, with two 
independent paths for each node, and sends them to the 
nodes. The second phase of data forwarding takes place 
based on the forwarding tables computed by the base station.  
SPINS is a suite of security protocols optimized for sensor 
networks [38]. SPINS includes two building blocks: (i) 
secure network encryption protocol (SNEP) and (ii) micro 
version of timed efficient streaming loss-tolerant 
authentication protocol (µTESLA). SNEP provides data 
confidentiality, two-party data authentication, and data 
freshness for peer-to-peer communication (node to base 
station). µTESLA provides authenticated broadcast as 
discussed already.  
SPINS assumes that each node is pre-distributed with a 
master key K which is shared with the base station at its time 
of creation. All the other keys, including a key Kencr for 
encryption, a key Kmac for MAC generation, and a key Krand 
for random number generation are derived from the master 
key using a string one-way function. SPINS uses RC5 
protocol for confidentiality. If A wants to send a message to 
base station B, the complete message A sends to B is: 
A  B : D<KencrC>, MAC(Kmac, C | D) <KencrC> 
In the above expression, D is the transmitted data and C is a 
shared counter between the sender and the receiver for the 
block cipher in counter mode. The counter C is incremented 
after each message is sent and received in both the sender 
and the receiver side. SNEP also provides a counter 
exchange protocol to synchronize the counter value in both 
sides.  
SNEP provides the flowing properties: 
Semantic security: the counter value is incremented after 
each message and thus the same message is encrypted 
differently each time. 
Data authentication: a receiver can be assured that the 
message originated from the claimed sender if the MAC 
verification produces positive results.  
Replay protection: the counter value in the MAC prevents 
replaying old messages by an adversary. 
Weak freshness: SPINS identifies two types of freshness. 
Weak freshness provides partial message ordering and carries 
no delay information. Strong freshness provides a total order 
on a request-response pair and allows delay estimation. IN 
SNEP, the counter maintains a message ordering in the 
receiver side and yields weak freshness. SNEP guarantees 
weak freshness only, since there is no guarantee to node A 
that a message was created by node B in response to an event 
in node A.  
Low communication overhead: the counter state is kept at 
each endpoint and need not be sent in each message. 
Inspired by the work on public key cryptography 
[23,24,80,100], Du et al have investigated the public key 
authentication problem [134]. The use of public key 
cryptography eases many problems in secure routing, for 
example, authentication and integrity. However, before a 
node A uses the public key from another node B, A must 
verify that the public key is actually B’s, i.e., A must 
authenticate B’s public key; otherwise, a man-in-the-middle 
attacks are possible. In general networks, public key 
authentication involves a signature verification on a 
certificate signed by a trusted third party Certificate 
Authority (CA) [136]. However, the signature verification 
operations are very expensive operations for sensor nodes. 
Du et al have proposed an efficient alternative that uses only 
one-way hash function for the public key authentication. The 
proposed scheme can be divided into two stages. In the pre-
distribution stage, A Merkle tree R is constructed with each 
leaf Li corresponding to a sensor node. Let pki represent node 
i’s public key, V be an internal tree node, and Vleft and Vright 
be V’s two children. The value of an internal tree node is 
denoted by Φ. The Merkel tree can then be constructed as 
follows:  
Φ (Li) = h (idi,  pki) for i = 1,….N 
Φ(V) = h (Φ(Vleft) || Φ(Vright)) 
In the above expressions, “||” represents the concatenation of 
two strings and h is a one-way hash function such as MD5 or 
SHA-1. Let R be the root of the tree. Each sensor node v 
needs to store the root value Φ(R) and the sibling node values 
λ1,……. λH along the path from v to R. If node A wants to 
authenticate B’s public key, B sends its public key pk along 
with the value of λ1,……. λH to node A. Then, A can use the 
same procedure to reconstruct the Merkle tree R` and 
calculate the root value Φ(R`). A will trust B to be authentic 
if Φ(R`) = Φ(R).A sensor node only needs H + 1 storage 
units for the extra hash values. Based on this scheme, Du et 
al further extended the idea to reduce the height of the 
Merkle tree to improve the communication overhead of the 
scheme. The proposed scheme is more efficient than 
signature verification on certificates. However, the scheme 
requires that some hash values be distributed in a pre-
distribution stage. This results in some scalability issues 
when new sensors are added to an existing WSN. 
Tanachaiwiwat et al have presented a novel secure routing 
protocol- trust routing for location aware sensor networks 
(TRANS) [69]. It is primarily meant for use in data centric 
networks. It makes use of a loose-time synchronization 
asymmetric cryptographic scheme to ensure message 
confidentiality. The authors have used µTESLA to ensure 
message authentication and confidentiality. Using µTESLA, 
TRANS is able to ensure that a message is sent along a path 
of trusted nodes utilizing location aware routing. The base 
station broadcasts an encrypted message to all its neighbors. 
Only the trusted neighbors will possess the shared key 
necessary to decrypt the message. The trusted neighbors then 
add their locations (for the return trip), encrypt the new 
message with their shared key and forward the message to 
their neighbors closest to the destination. Once the message 
reaches the destination, the recipient is able to authenticate 
the source (base station) using the MAC corresponding to the 
base station. To acknowledge or reply to the message, the 
destination node can simply forward a return message along 
the same trusted path from the message was received [69]. 
One particular challenge to secure routing in wireless sensor 
networks is that it is very easy for a single node to disrupt the 
routing process by disrupting the route discovery process. 
Papadimitratos and Hass have proposed a secure route 
discovery protocol that guarantees correct topology 
discovery in an ad hoc sensor network [49]. The security 
relies on the MAC (message authentication code) and an 
accumulation of the node identities along the route traversed 
by a message. In this way, a source node discovers the sensor 
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network topology as each node along the route from source 
to destination appends its identity to the message. In order to 
ensure that the message has not been tampered with, a MAC 
is verified at the source and the destination. 
5.5  Defense against the Sybil attack 
Any defense mechanism against the Sybil attack must ensure 
that a framework must be in place in the network to validate 
that a particular identity is the only identity being held by a 
given physical node [36]. Newsome et al have described 
three orthogonal dimensions of the Sybil attack taxonomy 
[36]. The three dimensions are: (i) direct vs. indirect 
communication, (ii) fabricated vs. stolen identities, and (iii) 
simultaneity. In direct communication, the Sybil nodes 
communicate directly with legitimate nodes. In this attack, 
when a legitimate node sends a radio message to a Sybil 
node, one of the malicious devices listens to the message. In 
indirect communication, no legitimate nodes are able to 
communicate directly with the Sybil nodes. Messages sent to 
a Sybil node are routed through one or more of malicious 
nodes which pretend to pass the message on to the Sybil 
node. In case of fabricated identities, the attacker creates 
arbitrary new Sybil identities. However, if a mechanism is in 
place to detect false identities, an attacker cannot fabricate 
new identities. In this case, the attacker needs to assign other 
legitimate identities to Sybil nodes. This identity theft may go 
undetected if the attacker destroys or temporarily disables the 
impersonated nodes.  In case of simultaneous attacks, the 
attacker tries to have all the Sybil identities participate in the 
network simultaneously. Alternatively the attacker may 
present a large number of identities over a period of time, 
while deploying a small number of identities at a given point 
of time. Newsome et al primarily describe direct validation 
techniques, including a radio resource test. In the radio test, a 
node assigns each of its neighbors a different channel and 
listens to each of them. If the node detects a transmission on 
the channel, it is assumed that the node transmitting on the 
channel is a physical node. Similarly, if the node does not 
detect a transmission on the specified channel, it assumes that 
the identity assigned to the channel is not a physical identity. 
Another technique to defend against the Sybil attack is to use 
random key pre-distribution techniques [9,19,22]. In random 
key pre-distribution, a random set of keys or key-related 
information are assigned to each sensor nodes, so that in the 
key set-up phase, each node can discover or compute the 
common keys it shares with its neighbors. The common keys 
are used as shared secret session keys to ensure node-to-node 
secrecy. Newsome et al have proposed that the identity of 
each node is associated with the keys assigned to the node 
[36]. With a limited set of captured keys, there is a little 
probability that an arbitrarily generated identity will work. 
5.6  Detection of node replication attack 
Parno, Perrig and Gligor have proposed a mechanism for 
distributed detection of node replication attacks in WSNs 
[56]. To address the fundamental limitations of  the existing 
mechanisms, e.g., single point of failure for centralized 
schemes, or neighborhood voting protocols that fail to detect 
distributed replications, the authors have proposed two 
algorithms that work through the collective actions of 
multiple nodes. The algorithms are: (i) randomized multicast 
and (ii) line-selected multicast. The randomized multicast 
algorithm distributes location information of a node to 
randomly-selected witnesses, exploiting birthday paradox to 
detect replicated nodes. The line-selected multicast uses the 
network topology to detect replication as discussed below.   
The randomized broadcast has evolved from traditional 
node-to-node broadcasting. In traditional node-to-node 
broadcasting, each node in the network uses an authenticated 
broadcast message to flood the network with its location 
information. Each node stores the location information of its 
neighbors and if it receives a conflicting claim, it revokes the 
offending node. This protocol can achieve 100% detection of 
all duplicate location claims if the broadcasts reach all the 
nodes. However, the total communication cost for the 
protocol is O(n2), which is too high for a large WSN. To 
reduce the communication cost of node-to-node-broadcast, 
deterministic multicast mechanism may be applied where a 
node’s location claim is shared with a limited subset of 
deterministically chosen witness nodes. The witnesses are 
chosen as a function of the node’s ID. If the adversary 
replicates a node, the witnesses will receive two different 
location claims for the same node ID. The conflicting 
location claims trigger the revocation of the replicated node. 
The randomized multicast approach suggested by Parno et al 
improves the robustness of the deterministic multicast. It 
randomizes the witnesses for a given node’s location claim, 
so that the adversary cannot anticipate their identities. When 
a node announces its location, each of its neighbors sends a 
copy of the location claim to a set of randomly selected 
witnesses. If the adversary replicates a node, then two sets of 
witnesses will be selected. In a network of n nodes, if each 
location produces √n   witnesses, then, the birthday paradox 
predicts at least one collision with high probability, i.e., at 
least one witness will receive a pair of conflicting location 
claims. The two conflicting location claims form sufficient 
evidence to revoke the node, so the witness can flood the pair 
of location claims through the network, and each node can 
independently confirm the revocation decision. 
Unfortunately, the communication and storage overheads for 
randomized multicast is too high- O(n2) and O(√n) 
respectively. The authors have suggested enhancements for 
improving the communication and storage overhead. 
To reduce the communication cost of the randomized 
multicast approach, Parno et al have proposed an alternative 
algorithm- the line selected multicast. It is based on the 
rumor routing protocol [2]. The idea is that a location claim 
traveling from source s to destination d will also travel 
through several intermediate nodes. If each of these nodes 
records the location claims, then the path of the location 
claim through the network can be thought of as a line 
segment. The destination of the location claim is one of the 
randomly chosen witnesses. As the location claim routes 
through the network towards a witness node, the intermediate 
sensors check the claim. If a conflicting location claim ever 
crosses a line, then the node at the intersection detects the 
conflict and initiates a revocation broadcast. The line 
selected multicast algorithm has communication overhead of 
O(n√n) as long as each line segment is of length O(√n) 
nodes. The storage overhead of the algorithm is O(√n). 
5.7  Defense against traffic analysis attack 
Deng, Han and Mishra have proposed a mechanism for 
defending against traffic analysis attack in a WSN [26]. The 
author have argued that since the base station is a central 
point of failure, once the location of the base station is 
discovered, an adversary can disable or destroy the base 
station, thereby rendering the data-gathering functionalities 
of the entire WSN ineffective. Two classes of traffic analysis 
attacks in WSNs are identified: (i) rate monitoring attack, 
and (ii) time correlation attack. In time correlation attack, an 
adversary monitors the packet sending rate of nodes near the 
adversary, and moves closer to the nodes that have a higher 
packet sending rate. In a time correlation attack, an adversary 
observes the correlation in sending time between a node and 
its neighbor node that is assumed to be forwarding the same 
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packet, and deduces the path by following the sound of each 
forwarding operation as the packet propagates towards the 
base station. The mechanism proposed by the authors 
prevents rate monitoring attack and time correlation attack. 
The mechanism involves four techniques. First, a multiple 
parent routing scheme is introduced that allows a sensor node 
to forward a packet to one of its multiple parents. This makes 
the patterns less pronounced in terms of routing packets 
towards the base station. Second, a controlled random walk is 
introduced into the multi-hop path traversed by a packet 
through the WSN towards the base station. This distributes 
packet traffic, thereby rendering the rate monitoring attack 
less effective. Third, random fake paths are introduced to 
confuse an adversary from tracking a packet as it moves 
towards a base station. This mitigates the effectiveness of 
time correlation attacks. Finally, multiple, random areas of 
high communication activities are created to deceive an 
adversary as to the true location of the base station, which 
further increases the difficulty of rate monitoring attacks. The 
combination of these four strategies makes the proposed 
mechanism extremely robust to any traffic analysis attack. 
5.8  Defense against attacks on sensor privacy 
The attacks on information privacy in WSNs have been 
discussed in Section 4. A number of mechanisms have been 
proposed for protecting information privacy in WSNs. Some 
of them are discussed below.  
5.8.1 Anonymity mechanisms 
Precise location information enables accurate identification 
of a user. This is a serious threat to privacy. One way to 
handle this problem is to make data source anonymous. An 
anonymity mechanism depersonalizes the data before it is 
released from the source. Grusterand and Grunwald have 
presented an analysis on the feasibility of anonymizing 
location information in location-based services in an 
automotive telematics environment [13]. Beresford and 
Stajano have proposed anonymity techniques for an indoor 
location system based on the Active Bat [11]. 
Since ensuring total anonymity is almost an impossible 
proposition, in almost all practical scenarios, a tradeoff is to 
be made between anonymity and disclosure of public 
information in most of the privacy protection mechanisms. 
Four approaches have been proposed by researchers in this 
direction [31,33, 72,68] for WSNs. These approaches are: (i) 
decentralization of storage of sensitive data, (ii) 
establishment of secure channel for communication, (iii) 
changing the pattern of data traffic, and (iv) exploiting 
mobility of the nodes. The sensitive location data is to be 
stored in a spanning tree of nodes so that no single node 
holds a complete view of the location information. 
Communication using secure protocols such as SPINS [38] 
will make eavesdropping and active attack on a WSN 
extremely difficult. The data traffic pattern may be changed 
by selectively inserting some bogus data in the network 
traffic so that traffic analysis by an external entity will not be 
successful. Mobile sensor nodes make attack on location 
privacy very difficult. The Cricket system [72] is a location-
support system for in-building, mobile, location dependent 
applications. It allows applications running on mobile and 
static nodes to learn their physical location from a set of 
listeners. The listeners hear and analyze information from 
beacons in a building.  
5.8.2 Policy-based approaches 
In policy-based defense mechanisms the access control 
decisions and authentication techniques are made on the basis 
of a specified set of privacy policies. Molnar and Wagner 
have presented the concept of private authentication and 
demonstrated its application in radio frequency identification 
(RFID) domain [47]. Duri et al have proposed a policy-based 
framework for protecting sensor information, where a 
computer in side a car acts as a trusted agent for location 
privacy [7].  Snekkenes have proposed various parameters 
for access control that enable specifying policies in the 
context of a mobile network [75]. Some of the parameters 
are: time of request, location, speed, and identity of the 
located object. Myles et al have described the architecture of 
a centralized location server that controls access requests 
from client applications through a set of validator modules 
based on a set of XML-coded privacy policies [54]. 
Hengarter and Steenkiste have discussed various challenges 
that arise for the specification and implementation of policies 
controlling access to location information [34]. The authors 
have also presented a design framework of an access control 
mechanism that is flexible enough to be deployed in different 
environment.  
5.8.3 Information flooding 
Ozturk et al proposed various modifications to WSN routing 
protocols for protecting the location information of a source 
node [57]. In particular, the authors have discussed a set of 
flooding protocols.   The randomized data routing and 
phantom traffic generation mechanism are used so that it is 
difficult for an adversary to track any data source. For 
ensuring privacy of source location the authors have 
discussed four types of flooding-based routing protocols: (i) 
baseline flooding, (ii) probabilistic flooding, (iii) flooding 
with fake messages, and (iv) phantom flooding. 
Baseline flooding: In the baseline flooding, every node in the 
network forwards a message only once, and no node 
retransmits a message that it has previously transmitted. 
When a message reaches an intermediate node, the node first 
checks whether it has received and forwarded the message 
before. If this is its first time, the node broadcasts the 
message to all its neighbors. Otherwise, it just discards the 
message. 
Probabilistic flooding: In probabilistic flooding, only a 
subset of nodes in the entire network participates in data 
forwarding, while the others simply discard the messages 
they receive. One possible weakness of this approach is that 
some messages may get lost in the network and as a result 
affect the overall network connectivity. However, the authors 
proved analytically that this is not a significant problem.  
Flooding with fake messages:  Flooding cannot provide 
privacy protection because an adversary can easily identify 
the shortest path between the source and the sink, and thereby 
back trace to the source location. The main reason for lack of 
location privacy is that there is only one source node. One 
approach that can alleviate the risk of source-location privacy 
breaching is to augment the flooding protocols so that more 
sources can be introduced that inject fake messages into the 
network. If the fake messages have the same length as the 
real messages and they are also encrypted, it will be 
impossible for an adversary to distinguish between them. 
Phantom flooding: Phantom flooding has the same principle 
as that of probabilistic flooding. It too attempts to direct 
messages to different locations of the network so that the 
adversary cannot receive a steady stream of messages to track 
the source. However, probabilistic flooding is not very 
effective since shorter paths are more likely to deliver more 
messages. Phantom flooding entices an attacker away for the 
real source and towards a fake source, called the phantom 
source. In phantom flooding, every message experiences two 
phase: (1) a walking phase, which may be a random walk or a 
directed walk, and (2) a subsequent flooding meant to deliver 
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the message to the sink. When the source sends out a 
message, the message is unicast in a random fashion within 
the first hwalk hops. This is called the random walk phase. 
After the hwalk hops, the message is flooded using the baseline 
flooding technique. This is the flooding phase. Phantom 
flooding significantly improves the privacy and network 
safety period because every message may take a different 
(shortest) path to reach any node in the network.  
Deng, Han and Mishra have addressed the problem of 
defending a base station against physical attacks by 
concealing the geographic location of the base station [26]. 
The authors have investigated several countermeasures 
against traffic analysis techniques aimed at disguising the 
location of a base station. In the proposed mechanism, a 
degree of randomness is introduced while selecting the multi-
hop route to the base station. Then, random fake packets are 
introduced as a packet moves towards a base station. Metrics 
such as total entropy of the network, total energy consumed, 
and the ability to guard against heuristic-based techniques to 
locate the base station are evaluated analytically as well as by 
extensive simulations. 
Xi, Schwiebert and Shi [62] have described a successful 
attack on the flooding-based phantom routing proposed by 
Ozturk et al [57]. The authors have also proposed greedy 
random walk (GROW) protocol, a two-way random walk, 
i.e., from both source and sink, to reduce the chance an 
eavesdropper can collect the location information.   In the 
proposed mechanism, the sink first initiates an N-hop random 
walk, and the source then initiates an M-hop random walk. 
Once the source packet reaches an intersection of these two 
paths, it is forwarded through the path created by the sink. 
Local broadcasting is used to detect when the two paths 
intersect. In order to minimize the chance of backtracking 
along the random walk, the nodes are stored in a bloom filter 
as the walk progresses. At each stage, the intermediate nodes 
are checked against the bloom filter to ensure that 
backtracking is minimized. 
5.9  Intrusion detection 
The security mechanisms implemented in secure routing 
protocols and secure data aggregation protocols are 
configured beforehand to prevent an attacker from breaking 
the security of the network. However, these security 
mechanisms alone cannot ensure security of a WSN. Since it 
is possible for an attacker to compromise a sensor node, it is 
easy for him to inject false data into a WSN. Authentication 
and data encryption are not enough for ensuring data 
security. Another approach to protect WSNs involves 
mechanisms for detecting and reacting to intrusions. 
An intrusion detection system (IDS) monitors a host or 
network for suspicious activity patterns outside normal and 
expected behavior [81]. It is based on the assumption that 
there exists a noticeable difference in the behavior of an 
intruder and legitimate user in the network such that an IDS 
can match those pre-programmed or possible learned rules. 
Based on the analysis model used for analyzing the audit data 
to detect intrusions, intrusion detection systems are usually 
classified into two types: (i) rule-based intrusion detection 
systems and (ii) anomaly-based intrusion detection systems 
[86]. Rule-based intrusion detection systems are used to 
detect known patterns of intrusions as in [137] and [138]. 
The anomaly-based systems are used to detect new or 
unknown intrusions as in [139] and [140] rule-based IDS has 
a low false-alarm rate compared to an anomaly-based system, 
and an anomaly-based IDS has a high intrusion detection rate 
in comparison to a rule-based system.  
However, WSNs are generally application-specific and lack 
basic information on topology, normal usage, expected 
communication patterns, etc. It is impractical to pre-install 
some fixed patterns in sensors before they are deployed. 
Moreover, due to constraints in sensors, to learn and detect 
these parameters after deployment is both time and energy 
consuming. Thus, existing intrusion detection schemes in ad 
hoc networks may not be adapted to WSNs. 
The research on intrusion detection in WSNs is still 
preliminary. Current research focuses on how to detect and 
eliminate injected false information. Thus, cooperation 
among sensors, especially neighboring nodes, is necessary to 
decide the validity of a report. The following subsection 
discusses some existing mechanisms of intrusion detection 
for WSNs.  
5.9.1 Intrusion detection in WSNs 
Brutch and Ko have discussed various types of possible 
attacks against WSNs and presented three different 
architectures for intrusion detection [29]. The first is a stand-
alone architecture. In this case, each node functions as an 
independent intrusion detection system and is responsible for 
detecting attacks directed towards it. The nodes do not 
exchange and intrusion data and no cooperative detection 
mechanisms are deployed. The second architecture is a 
distributed and cooperative architecture. In this architecture, 
an intrusion detection agent is deployed on each node. While 
the local agents are responsible for detecting local attacks on 
the nodes, they also cooperate among themselves by 
exchanging intrusion related data to detect global intrusion 
attempts. The third architecture proposed by the author is a 
hierarchical architecture. This is suitable for a multi-layered 
WSN, where the network is divided into clusters with the 
cluster-head node being responsible for routing within a 
cluster. The multi-layered networks are primarily used for 
event correlation. 
Zhu et al proposed an interleaved hop-by-hop authentication 
(IHOP) scheme in [141]. IHOP guarantees that the base 
station will detect any injected false data packets when no 
more than a certain number t of nodes are compromised. The 
sensor network is organized in a cluster-based hierarchy. 
Each cluster-head builds a route to the base station and each 
intermediate node has an upper associate node and a lower 
associate node that is t + 1 hops away. IHOP uses a number 
of shared keys: (i) every node shares a master key with the 
base station, (ii) each node knows its one-hop neighbors and 
has established a pair-wise key with each of them, (iii) a node 
can establish a pair-wise key with another node that is 
multiple hops away if needed.  
Further, IHOP also assumes that the base station has a 
mechanism to authenticate broadcast messages, e.g., 
µTESLA. A cluster-head collects information from its 
members and sends a report to the base station only when at 
least t + 1 sensors observer the same result. Meanwhile a 
cluster-head also collects the MACs from detecting nodes. 
Each detecting node sends two MACs to the cluster-head: a 
MAC using the key shared with the base station, referred to 
as the individual MAC, and a MAC using the key shared with 
its upper associate nodes, referred to as the pair-wise MAC. 
The cluster-head then compresses the t + 1 individual MACs 
by XORing them to reduce the size of the report. However, 
the pair-wise MACs are not compressed for transmission. If 
they were, a node replaying the message would not be able to 
extract the pair-wise MACs and a compressed MAC for the 
base station. When an intermediate node receives a report, it 
verifies the MAC of its lower associate node. If it fails, the 
report is eliminated. Otherwise, it removes the MAC, 
generates a new MAC using its upper associate node pair-
wise key, and appends it to the report. However, the pair-
wise MACs are not compromised for transmission. If they 
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were, a node relaying the message would not be able to 
extract the pair-wise MACs of interest to it. Thus, a 
legitimate report includes t + 1 pair-wise MACs and a 
compressed MAC for the base station. When an intermediate 
node receives a report, it verifies the MAC of its lower 
associate node. If it fails, the report is eliminated. Otherwise, 
it removes the MAC, generates a new MAC using its upper 
associate node pair-wise key, and appends it to the report. 
IHOP ensures that the base station can detect false data 
packets when no more than t nodes are compromised. 
However, the authors have not shown how to select the 
parameter t for a sensor network. 
Wang et al proposed a scheme to detect whether a node is 
faulty or malicious with the collaboration of neighbor nodes 
[142]. In the proposed scheme, when a node suspects that 
one of its neighbors is faulty, it sends out messages to request 
the opinions on the behavior of this suspected node from 
other neighbors of the suspect. After collecting the results, 
the node analyzes the results to diagnose whether the suspect 
has a fault. The authors formalized the problem as how to 
construct a dominating tree to cover all the neighbors of the 
suspect and further proposed two tree-based propagation 
collection protocols to construct a dominating tree and 
collect information via the tree structure.  
Albers et al have proposed an intrusion detection architecture 
based on local intrusion detection system (LIDS) on each 
node in a wireless ad hoc network [5]. In order to detect a 
network-wide intrusion, the LIDS on the nodes collaborate 
with each other and exchange two types of data- security data 
and intrusion alerts. The security data is used to exchange 
information with other network hosts. The intrusion alerts are 
used to inform LIDS in the neighboring nodes to exchange 
intrusion related information. Although the framework is for 
an ad hoc network, its approach of local anomaly detection 
and cooperatively detecting any network-wide intrusion can 
be adapted to develop an IDS for a WSN [21].  
Intrusion detection in WSNs is still largely open to research. 
Two key research issues are: 
Due to the constraints in WSNs, intrusion detection has many 
aspects not of concern in other network types. The problem 
of intrusion detection needs to be well defined in WSNs. 
The proposed IDs protocols in the literature focus on filtering 
injected false information only [28,83,141]. These protocols 
need to be improved to address scalability issues.  
5.10  Secure data aggregation 
Data communication constitutes an important share of the 
total energy consumption of a sensor network. Simulation 
[38] shows that data transmission accounts for 71 percent of 
the energy cost of computation and communication for the 
SNEP protocols. An efficient data aggregation mechanism 
can greatly help in optimizing the energy consumption. 
In a WSN, there are certain nodes called aggregators which 
are responsible to carry out data aggregation operations. If an 
aggregator node is compromised, it is easy for an adversary 
to inject false data into the network. Another possible attack 
is to compromise a sensor node and inject forged data 
through it. Without authentication, the attackers may fool the 
aggregators into reporting false data to the base station. 
Secure data aggregation requires authentication, 
confidentiality, and integrity. Moreover, secure data 
aggregation also requires cooperation among the sensor 
nodes to identify the compromised sensors.  
Before discussing some secure aggregation mechanisms 
existing in the literature, an overview of some well-known 
aggregation techniques are presented. 
In [21], the authors have proposed a clustering-based 
algorithm that uses directed diffusion technique to gather a 
global perspective utilizing only the local nodes in each 
cluster. The nodes are assigned different level with level 0 
being assigned to the nodes lying at the lowest level. The 
nodes at the higher level can communicate across clusters. 
The nodes at the lower level can communicate among the 
nodes in the same cluster and the cluster head. This 
effectively enables localized cluster computation while the 
higher level nodes communicate the local information of the 
clusters to achieve a global picture. 
In [52], the authors have proposed a mechanism called TAG. 
It is a generic data aggregation mechanism that involves a 
language similar to SQL to generate queries in a WSN. The 
base station generates a query using this language. The 
sensor nodes sends the reply using routes constructed based 
on a routing tree. At each point in the tree, the data is 
aggregated using some aggregation function that was defined 
in the initial query sent. 
Srivastava et al have proposed a summary structure for 
supporting fairly complex aggregate functions, such as 
median and range queries [64]. In addition, computation of 
relatively easier functions such as min/max, sum, and average 
are also supported in the proposed framework. However, 
more complex aggregate, such as the most frequently 
reported data value is not supported. The computed 
aggregate functions are approximate but the estimate errors 
are statistically bounded.  
A number of secure aggregation protocols for WSNs exist in 
the literature. However, fundamentally there is a conflict of 
interests in data confidentiality and data aggregation. 
Confidentiality requires the data to be transmitted in 
ciphertext mode, whereas data aggregation is usually done on 
plaintext contents. A straight-forward method is to invoke 
end-to-end encryption before executing data aggregation. 
This strategy, however, has a shortcoming. The encryption 
and decryption operations involve a substantial computation 
overhead. An alternative method is to provide data 
aggregation on concealed data, which requires a particular 
class of encryption transformation. However, this method 
usually reduces the security level [97]. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.      Secure data aggregation in WSNs 
(Source: Y. Wang, G. Attebury, and B. Ramamurthy, IEEE 
Communication and Tutorials, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 2-23, 2006) 
 
Figure 4 shows a taxonomy of secure data aggregation 
protocols for WSNs. There are two categories of secure 
aggregation protocols: (i) plaintext-based, and (ii) ciphertext-
based. 
5.10.1 Secure aggregation on plaintext data 
Hu and Evans have proposed a secure aggregation (SA) 
protocol that uses the µTESLA protocol [30]. The protocol is 
resilient to both intruder devices and single device key 
compromises. In the proposition, the sensor nodes are 
organized into a tree where the internal nodes act as the 
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aggregators. However, the protocol is vulnerable if a parent 
and one of its child nodes are compromised, since due to the 
delayed disclosure of symmetric keys, the parent node will 
not be able to immediately verify the authenticity of the data 
sent by its children nodes.  
Przydatek et al have presented a secure information 
aggregation (SIA) framework for sensor networks [77]. The 
framework consists of three categories of node: a home 
server, base station and sensor nodes. A base station is a 
resource-enhanced node which is used as an intermediary 
between the home server and the sensor nodes, and it is also 
the candidate to perform the aggregation task. SIA assumes 
that each sensor has a unique identifier and shares a separate 
secret cryptographic key with both the home server and the 
aggregator. The keys enable message authentication and 
encryption if data confidentiality is required. Moreover, it 
further assumes that the home server and the base station can 
use a mechanism, such as uTESLA, to broadcast 
authenticated messages. The proposed solution follows 
aggregate-commit-prove approach.  
In the first phase- aggregate- the aggregator collects data 
from sensors and locally computes the aggregation result 
using some specific aggregate function. Each sensor shares a 
key with the aggregator. This allows the aggregator to verify 
whether the sensor reading is authentic. However, there is a 
possibility that a sensor may have been compromised and an 
adversary has captured the key. In the proposed scheme there 
is no mechanism to detect such an event.  
In the second phase, i.e. commit phase, the aggregator 
commits to the collected data. This phase ensures that the 
aggregator actually uses the data collected from the sensors, 
and the statement to be verified by the home server about the 
correctness of computed results is meaningful. One efficient 
mechanism for committing is a Merkle hash-tree construction 
[53]. In this method, the data collected from the sensors is 
placed at the leaves of a tree. The aggregator then computes a 
binary hash tree staring with the leaf nodes. Each internal 
node in the hash tree is computed as the hash value of the 
concatenation of its two children nodes. The root of the tree 
is called the commitment of the collected data. As the hash 
function  is collision free, once the aggregator commits to the 
collected values, it cannot change any of the collected values.  
In the third and final phase, the aggregator and the home 
server engage in a protocol in which the aggregator 
communicates the aggregation result. In addition, aggregator 
uses an interactive proof protocol to prove correctness of the 
reported results. This is done in two logical steps. In the first 
step, the home server ensures that the committed data is a 
good representation of the sensor data readings collected. In 
the second step, the home server checks the reliability of the 
aggregator output. This is done by checking whether the 
aggregation result is close to the committed results. The 
interactive proof protocol varies depending on the 
aggregation function is being used.  Moreover, the authors 
also presented efficient protocols for secure computation of 
the median and the average of the measurements, for the 
estimation of the network size, and for finding the minimum 
and maximum sensor reading.  
Deng e al proposed a collection of mechanisms for securing 
in-network processing (SINP) for WSNs [143]. These 
mechanisms were proposed to address the downstream 
requirement that sensor nodes authenticate commands 
disseminated from parent aggregators and the upstream 
requirement that aggregators authenticate data produced by 
sensors before aggregating that data. In the downstream 
stage, two techniques are involved: one way functions and 
µTESLA. The upstream stage requires that a pair-wise key be 
shared between an aggregator and its sensor nodes.  
Cam et al proposed an energy-efficient secure pattern-based 
data aggregation (ESPDA) protocol for wireless sensor 
networks [144,145]. ESPDA is applicable for hierarchy-
based sensor networks. In ESPDA, a cluster-head first 
requests sensor nodes to send the corresponding pattern code 
for the sensed data. If multiple sensor nodes send the same 
pattern code to the cluster-head, only one of them is 
permitted to send the data to the cluster-head. ESPDA is 
secure because it does not require encrypted data to be 
decrypted by cluster-heads to perform data aggregation. 
Cam et al have introduced another secure differential data 
aggregation (SDDA) scheme based on pattern codes [146]. 
SDDA prevents redundant data transmission from sensor 
nodes by implementing the following schemes: (1) SDDA 
transmits differential data rather than raw data, (2) SDDA 
performs data aggregation on pattern codes representing the 
main characteristics of the sensed data, and (3) SDDA 
employs a sleep protocol to coordinate the activation of 
sensing units in such a way that only one of the sensor nodes 
capable of sensing the data is activated at a given time. In the 
SDDA data transmission scheme, the raw data from sensor 
nodes is compared to reference data with the difference data 
being transmitted. The reference data is obtained by taking 
the average of previously transmitted data. 
Du et al proposed a witness-based data aggregation (WDA) 
scheme for WSNs to assure the validation of the data fusion 
nodes to the base station [128]. To prove the validity of the 
fusion results, the fusion node has to provide proofs from 
several witnesses. A witness is one who also conducts data 
fusion like a data fusion node, but does not forward its result 
to the base station. Instead, each witness computes the MAC 
of the result and then provides it to the data fusion node, 
which must forward the proofs to the base station. 
Wagner studied secure data aggregation in sensor networks 
and proposed a mathematical framework for formally 
evaluating their security [71]. The robustness of an 
aggregation operator against malicious data is quantified.  
Ye et al have proposed a statistical en-route filtering 
mechanism to detect any forged data being sent from the 
sensor nodes to the base station of a WSN [83]. It utilizes 
multiple message authentication codes (MACs) along the 
path from the aggregator to the base station. 
5.10.2 Secure aggregation on ciphertext data 
Two ciphertext-based secure data aggregation schemes have 
been proposed in [147] and [148]. The propositions are 
based on a particular encryption transformation: a privacy 
homomorphism (PH). A privacy homomorphism is an 
encryption transformation that allows direct computation on 
the encrypted data. Let Q and R denote two rings, and let + 
denote addition and x denote multiplication on the two rings. 
Let K be the key space. We denote an encryption 
transformation E: K x Q  R and the corresponding 
decryption transformation D: K x R  Q. Given a, b ε Q and 
k ε K, the following operation is termed as additively 
homomorphic. 
a + b = Dk (Ek(a) + Ek(b)) 
Similarly, the following operation is termed as 
multiplicatively homomorphic [152]. 
a x b = Dk(Ek(a) x Ek(b)) 
The proposed scheme, concealed data aggregation (CDA) in 
[147] is based on the PH proposed in [149]. Although the 
study in [150] has shown that the proposed PH in [149] is 
insecure against chosen plaintext attacks for some parameter 
settings, the authors in [147] claimed that for the WSN data 
aggregation scenario, the security level is still adequate and 
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the proposed PH method in [149] can be employed for 
encryption. CDA can be used to calculate SUM and 
AVERAGE in a hierarchical WSN. To calculate AVERAGE, 
an aggregator needs to know the number of sensor nodes n.  
Castelluccia et al proposed a simple and provable secure 
additively homomorphic stream cipher (HSC) that allows for 
the efficient aggregation of encrypted data [148]. The new 
cipher uses modular addition and is therefore very well suited 
for CPU-constrained devices such as those in WSNs. The 
aggregation based on this cipher can be used to efficiently 
compute statistical values such as the mean, variance, and 
standard deviation of sensed data. 
Secure data aggregation activity is an extremely important 
issue in WSNs. Several secure data aggregation protocols 
have been proposed by the researchers. However, no 
comparisons have been conducted on these proposed 
protocols. Further evaluations are required to get an idea 
about the performance of these protocols. The performance 
metrics might include security, processing overhead, 
communication overhead, energy consumption, data 
compression etc. Moreover, new data aggregation protocols 
are needed to address higher scalability and higher reliability 
against aggregator and sensor node cheating [97]. 
5.11  Defense against physical attacks 
To protect against a possible physical attack, sensor nodes 
may be equipped with special hardware.   The sensor nodes 
in a WSN may be protected against tampering by tamper-
proofing the physical packages of the sensors [81]. 
Researchers have also proposed mechanisms that focus on 
building tamper-resistant hardware in order to make the 
memory contents on the sensor chip inaccessible to a 
potential external attacker [10, 1, 41]. Special-purpose 
software and hardware may also be deployed outside the 
sensor nodes to detect physical tampering. Self-termination 
of sensor nodes is an effective mechanism to defend against 
possible data theft in the event of a physical attack. The basic 
idea in this case is that whenever a sensor senses an attack it 
kills itself and destroys all data and keys stored in its 
memory. This is particularly feasible in a large-scale WSN 
where there is enough redundancy of information and 
connectivity among the nodes. However, the main challenge 
is to accurately identify a physical attack. A simple solution 
is to periodically verify the neighborhood information for 
each node. In case of a mobile sensor network, this is an open 
problem. A number of techniques have been discussed for 
extracting protected data from card processor [10, 41]. These 
techniques include manual micro-probing, laser cutting, 
focused ion-beam manipulation, glitch attacks, power 
analysis etc. Most of these techniques may be used to launch 
physical attacks on sensor nodes in a WSN. Anderson et al 
have proposed counter-measures for each of these attacks [1]. 
In [10,41], the authors describe techniques for extracting 
protected software and data from smart card processors. This 
includes manual micro-probing, laser cutting, focused ion-
beam manipulation, glitch attacks, and power analysis, most 
of which are also possible physical attacks on the sensor. 
Based on an analysis of these attacks, Andersen et al give 
examples of low-cost protection countermeasures that make 
such attacks considerably more difficult, including [1].  
Deng et al have proposed various approaches for protecting 
sensors by deploying components outside them [17]. Sastry 
et al have presented ECHO protocol for secure and reliable 
location verification of sensor nodes in a WSN [73]. The 
scheme is based on the physical properties of sound and RF 
signal propagation from the sensor nodes. It is not possible 
for an adversary to cheat and falsely claim a shorter distance 
from the base station by transmitting its ultrasonic sound 
response early, because it will not be able to produce the 
required nonce for verification. In [61], the authors presented 
defense mechanisms against Search-based Physical Attacks. 
The authors have also discussed a systematic modeling 
framework for blind physical attacks [79].  The defense 
mechanism against physical attacks as proposed by the 
authors involves two phases. In the first phase, the sensors 
detect the attacker and send out attack notification messages 
in the network. In the second phase, the sensors that receive 
the notification messages schedule their states to switch off 
mode. Seshadri et al have proposed a mechanism called 
SWATT, to detect a sudden and abrupt change in the 
memory contents of a sensor node [74]. An abrupt change in 
the memory content of a sensor indicates possibility of a 
physical attack. 
5.12   Trust management 
Application of trust and reputation-based frameworks for 
enforcing high-level of security in WSNs is another 
approach. In fact trust-based schemes can protect against 
attacks which are beyond the capabilities of the 
cryptographic security. For example issues like judging the 
quality and reliability of sensor nodes and wireless links, data 
aggregation reliability and correctness of aggregator nodes, 
timeliness in packet forwarding of the sensors etc are can be 
addressed effectively in a systematic manner with the help of 
a trust-based framework.  However, trust-based models 
usually involve high computational overhead, and building an 
efficient scheme for resource-constrained WSNs is a very 
challenging task.  
Pirzada and Mcdonald [95] have proposed an approach for 
building trust relationship between the nodes in an ad hoc 
network. It is assumed that the nodes in the network passively 
monitor the packets received and forwarded by the other 
nodes. The receiving and forwarding activities by the nodes 
are termed as events. Events are observed and given a weight, 
depending on the type of application requiring a trust 
relationship with other nodes. The weights reflect the 
significance of the observed events for the corresponding 
application. The trust values for all events from a node are 
combined using weights to compute an aggregate trust level 
for the node. The computed trust values are used as link 
weights for the computation of routes. Links which connect 
more trust-worthy nodes will be having smaller weights. A 
shortest-path routing algorithm would compute the most 
trustworthy paths in a network. 
In [55], the author has described methods of finding paths 
from a source node to a designated target node in a peer-to-
peer computing paradigm. Extending this approach, Zhu et al 
[84] provide a practical approach to compute trust in wireless 
networks by treating individual mobile device as a node of a 
delegation graph G and mapping a delegation path from a 
source node S to a target node T into an edge in the 
corresponding transitive closure of the graph G. From the 
edges of the transitive closure of the graph G, the trust values 
of the wireless links are computed. In the proposed trust-
based framework, an undirected transitive signature scheme 
is used within the authenticated transitive graphs. 
Yen et al have proposed a security solution based on trust 
framework to ensure data protection, secure routing and other 
security features in an ad hoc network [82]. Mechanisms of 
logical and computational trust analysis and evaluation are 
applied on the nodes. Each node evaluates the trust of its 
peers based on factors such as experience statistics, data 
value, intrusion detection results, recommendations from its 
other neighbors. Ren et al have presented a technique to 
establish trust relationships among nodes in an ad hoc 
network [60].  The proposed framework is a probabilistic 
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solution based on a distributed trust model. A secret dealer is 
introduced only in the system bootstrapping phase to initiate 
the trust propagation. Shorter and more robust trust chains 
are subsequently developed among the nodes. A fully self-
organized trust establishment approach is then adopted to 
conform to the dynamic membership changes.  
Ganeriwal and Srivastava have proposed a reputation-based 
framework for high integrity sensor networks [8]. The 
framework employs a beta distribution for reputation 
representation, updates, and integration. Tanachaiwiwat et al 
[70] have proposed a mechanism of location-centric isolation 
of nodes exhibiting misbehavior and trust-based routing 
among nodes a in sensor networks. The trust valued of a node 
is computed based on the cryptographic suite being applied, 
availability statistics and the packet forwarding information 
of the node. If computed trust associated with a node falls 
below a threshold, the node’s location is considered insecure 
and it is avoided in routing process. 
Linag and Shi have carried out extensive work on 
development of models and evaluating robustness and 
security of various aggregation algorithms in open and 
untrusted environment [92, 93]. These models may be 
adapted for deployment of trust-frameworks in WSN. In [39], 
the authors have proposed a personalized trust model called 
PET for nodes in a WSN. In [92], for aggregation of various 
ratings received from its peer sensor nodes, a comprehensive 
analytical and inference model of trust have been presented. 
The authors have observed that the memory limitation is a 
serious constraint for sensor nodes for storing knowledge 
related to computation of a trust-based framework. The 
simulation results show that it is better to treat ratings 
received from different evaluators (i.e., nodes) with equal 
weight and simply compute the average to arrive at the final 
trust value. This approach not only has a very low 
computational overhead, it also produces very satisfactory 
result in practice. The authors also observe that for a trust 
model most important and critical issue is how to adaptively 
adjust the parameters of the model based on the change in 
environment.   
6. Conclusions and Future Trends  
Although research efforts have been made on cryptography, 
key management, secure routing, secure data aggregation, 
and intrusion detection in WSNs, there are still some 
challenges to be addressed. First, the selection of the 
appropriate cryptographic methods depends on the 
processing capability of sensor nodes, indicating that there is 
no unified solution for all sensor networks. Instead, the 
security mechanisms are highly application-specific. Second, 
sensors are characterized by the constraints on energy, 
computation capability, memory, and communication 
bandwidth. The design of security services in WSNs must 
satisfy these constraints. Third, most of the current protocols 
assume that the sensor nodes and the base station are 
stationary. However, there may be situations, such as 
battlefield environments, where the base station and possibly 
the sensors need to be mobile. The mobility of sensor nodes 
has a great influence on sensor network topology and thus 
raises many issues in secure routing protocols. Some future 
trends in WSN security research are identified as follows: 
Exploit the availability of private key operations on sensor 
nodes: recent studies on public key cryptography have shown 
that public key operations may be practical in sensor nodes. 
However, private key operations are still very expensive to 
realize in sensor nodes. As public key cryptography can 
greatly ease the design of security in WSNs, improving the 
efficiency of private key operations on sensor nodes is highly 
desirable. 
Secure routing protocols for mobile sensor networks: 
mobility of sensor nodes has a great influence on sensor 
network topology and thus on the routing protocols. Mobility 
can be at the base station, sensor nodes, or both. Current 
protocols assume the sensor network is stationary. New 
secure routing protocols for mobile sensor networks need to 
be developed. 
Continuous stream security in WSNs: current work on 
security in sensor networks focuses on discrete events such as 
temperature and humidity. Continuous stream events such as 
video and images are not discussed. Video and image sensors 
for WSNs might not be widely available now, but will be 
likely in the future. Substantial differences in authentication 
and encryption exist between discrete events and continuous 
events, indicating that there will be distinctions between 
continuous stream security and the current protocols in 
WSNs. 
QoS and security: performance is generally degraded with 
the addition of security services in WSNs. Current studies on 
security in WSNs focus on individual topics such as key 
management, secure routing, secure data aggregation, and 
intrusion detection. QoS and security services need to be 
evaluated together in WSNs. 
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